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Unions are dead, and they aren’t coming back. Over the second half of the
twentieth century and into the beginning of the twenty-first, organized labor steadily lost its grip on the American workplace, declining in reach, import, and influence.1 This decline has been the subject of close academic scrutiny. 2 Scholars have
offered a variety of explanations, including employer recalcitrance, political defeats, and labor’s own failure to invest in organizing new members.3
This Article is less concerned with those causes than with what has sprouted
in the wake of labor’s decline. The same decades that bore witness to labor’s collapse saw the flowering of modern employment law—a patchwork of regulations,
statutes, and court-made rules that govern the modern workplace. 4 As labor unions
receded, employment law grew up through its cracks, offering workers protection
from discrimination, guaranteeing them certain minimum benefits, and shielding
them against some of the worst forms of employer abuse. 5

* B.A. Old Dominion University (2009); J.D. William & Mary School of Law (2012); Law
Clerk to the Honorable Senior Judges of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals (2012−13); Honors
Attorney, United States Postal Service Office of General Counsel (Current). The views expressed in this
article are the author’s alone, and do not represent those of the United States Postal Service.
1. Bruce Western & Jake Rosenfeld, Workers of the World Divide, HUFFINGTONPOST (Apr. 18,
2012, 5:35 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bruce-western/decline-of-unions_b_1435750.html.
2. See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Law and the Future of Organized Labor in America, 49 WAYNE
L. REV. 685 (2003).
3. See, e.g., Sharon Rabin Margalioth, The Significance of Worker Attitudes: Individualism as a
Cause for Labor’s Decline, 16 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 133 (1998); Dave Hagaman, Dave’s in Box:
Musings on the State of Unions, 18 NO. 12 GA. EMP. L. LETTER 3 (2006).
4. See William R. Corbett, Waiting for the Labor Law of the Twenty-First Century Waiting for
the Labor Law of the Twenty-First Century: Everything Old is New Again, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
259, 261 (2002) [hereinafter Corbett, Labor Law].
5. See id. at 261.
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Although employment law and labor law cover much of the same ground, the
former is not merely the latter with a new coat of paint. 6 Rather, employment law
approaches workplace regulation in a fundamentally different way than its predecessor.7 Whereas labor law empowered employees by facilitating collective solutions, employment law does so by creating individual rights and remedies.8 And in
part because of this difference in approach, employment law provides many of the
same benefits as the old collective-bargaining model, while avoiding some of that
model’s worst aspects.9 It provides a degree of stability and certainty, but does not
cripple employers with uncompetitive labor costs.10 It provides workers with certain universal employment rights, while not fostering unjustified distinctions between unionized and nonunionized employers and employees.11
The transition from labor law to employment law, however, is far from complete.12 Employment law currently falls well short of protecting employees in the
way that unions once did.13 While employment law gives employees certain narrow
workplace rights, most of the terms and conditions of employment are still determined by bargaining.14 And as unions have declined, that bargaining has increasingly taken place between employers and individual employees.15 But employees
cannot, on their own, demand the type of concessions unions were once able to
extract.16 As a result, today most nonunion employees cannot resist declining wages, cannot object to certain forms of discrimination, and cannot push back against
wholly arbitrary discharges.17
This vulnerability, along with some potential solutions, is the subject of this
Article. First, in Part I, I track organized labor’s decline and show how it coincided
with employment law’s rise. I conclude that whether there is a causal relationship
between these two divergent trends is ultimately irrelevant, because the transition is
unlikely to reverse itself.18 Employment law is here to stay, and we must deal with
it on its own terms.19
In Part II, I examine some of the transition’s theoretical implications and conclude that the employment-law approach can improve upon the collectivebargaining model in a number of ways.20 For instance, while collective bargaining
has been criticized for saddling employers with uncompetitive labor costs, employment law imposes those costs in a uniform, nondiscriminatory manner. 21 In this
6. See id. at 263.
7. See id. at 263.
8. See id. at 274.
9. See id. at 263–77.
10. See Corbett, Labor Law, supra note 4, at 263–77.
11. See id. at 263–77.
12. See id. at 272–99.
13. See id. at 269–78.
14. See id. at 272.
15. See Brian D. Shonk, Case Note, Individual Employee Rights Versus the Rights of Employers
as a Group: NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 27 B.C.L. REV. 453, 458–59 (1986).
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See infra Part I.
19. See infra Part I, pp. 11–12.
20. See infra Part II, pp. 13–16.
21. See Morgan O. Reynolds, Labor Unions, LIBR. OF ECON. & LIBERTY (2008),
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/LaborUnions.html.
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way, employment law levels the playing field among employers.22 Moreover, employment law extends certain rights to all workers, regardless of their membership
in a union or willingness to bargain collectively. 23 Thus, employment law is more
efficient and egalitarian.24
Equality, however, is cold comfort to those employees left without meaningful legal protections against still-prevalent forms of employer abuse. 25 Thus, in Part
III, I argue that employment law currently falls well short of filling the role unions
once played in counterbalancing employers’ near-unilateral power over the employment relationship. And if employment law is ever to do so, lawmakers must
strengthen it—preferably at the national level. 26 As a starting point, I propose three
specific steps: 1) raising the minimum wage and indexing it to inflation; 2) adopting antidiscrimination legislation to protect working parents and other primary
caregivers; and 3) enacting a national good-cause discharge law.27 I argue that each
of these steps would provide workers with the legal protections they need, but can
no longer effectively bargain for, while avoiding imposing untenable burdens on
employers.
Labor unions and the old collective-bargaining model are dead and gone.28
Now, we must deal with their replacements: employment law and individual workplace rights. These replacements are not perfect, but they are what we have, and
they have their own strengths.29 Lawmakers’ task going forward is to build on these
strengths, while avoiding collective bargaining’s pitfalls. 30 This Article proposes a
few ways to do so.
I
Organized labor’s decline in the United States has been long in the making,
its strength withering like grapes withering on the vine.31 Unionization rates peaked
in the early 1950s, with labor unions representing roughly one-third of the nonagricultural private labor force.32 Since that peak, the unionization rate has fallen, with
the decline accelerating in the 1970s.33 Between 1974 and 1985, the percentage of
American workers covered by a union-negotiated collective bargaining agreement
(“CBA”) fell from 29.9% to 20.5%.34 And despite some initial success in slowing

22. See generally id.
23. See Corbett, Labor Law, supra note 4, at 263–65; see also Shonk, supra note 15, at 458–59.
24. See generally Shonk, supra note 15, at 454–62.
25. See generally id.
26. See infra Part III, pp. 24–26.
27. See infra Part III, pp. 26.
28. See Corbett, Labor Law, supra note 4, at 269–77.
29. See id. at 270–79.
30. Id.
31. See generally Paul Berks, Social Change and Judicial Response: the Handbook Exception to
Employment-at-Will, 4 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 231 (2000).
32. Id. at 256.
33. Id. at 256–57.
34. Id. at 255.
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this erosion by organizing public-sector workers,35 unions ultimately failed to stop
the bleeding.36 By 2002, unions represented only 13.5% of all workers, including
only 9% of private-sector employees.37 By 2012, those numbers had fallen to 11.3
% and 6.6%, respectively.38 Ominously for labor’s proponents, unionization rates
are now lowest among the youngest workers.39 Although 14.9% of workers aged
fifty-five to sixty-four are union members, the unionization rate is only 4.2%
among those aged sixteen to twenty-four.40 Moreover, unions have failed to make
up their losses by organizing in new industries, and have even lost strength in sectors that were once labor strongholds, such as the automotive industry.41
Flailing against the current, some scholars have called for labor-law reforms,
typically focusing on strengthening unions’ bargaining positions by enhancing their
ability to organize.42 But in the contemporary political climate, such proposals are
more wishful thinking than viable policy solutions. The 2010 elections swept conservative Republicans into office across the country, and these freshly minted lawmakers wasted no time in launching full-scale offensives against organized labor.43
In the most visible example, Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker stripped the state’s
public unions of their right to collectively bargain on any topic but wages.44 Conservative lawmakers also moved against labor unions in Ohio45 and Indiana,46 with
35. Id. at 256 (noting that “union membership among public sector workers rose from barely
10% in 1960 to over 40% in 1976.”).
36. Id.
37. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union Members in 2002, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (Feb. 25, 2003,
10:00 AM), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/history/union2_02252003.txt.
38. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Economic News Release: Union Member Summary, BUREAU OF LAB.
STAT. (Jan. 23, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm [hereinafter BLS: Union
Members].
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See
Let’s
go
German,
THE
ECONOMIST
(Aug.
3,
2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21582517-americas-car-workers-union-seeks-foot-door-vwsplant-lets-go-german
(reporting that membership in the United Auto Workers has fallen from a peak of 1.5 million to
400,000, and that the union has struggled to organize foreign car manufacturers’ employees in the United
States).
42. E.g., Cynthia Estlund, Labor Law Reform Again? Reframing Labor Law as a Regulatory
Project, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 383, 385 (2013); Roger C. Hartley, Non-Legislative Labor Law
Reform and Pre-Recognition Labor Neutrality Agreements: The Newest Civil Rights Movement, 22
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 369, 370–71 (2001); Henry H. Drummonds, Reforming Labor Law by Reforming Labor Law Preemption Doctrine to Allow the States to Make More Labor Relations Policy, 70 LA.
L. REV. 97, 99–100 (2009).
43. Scott Neuman, What Wisconsin’s Recall Means for Labor Unions, NPR (June 06, 2012,
3:42 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/06/06/154448777/what-wisconsins-recall-means-for-labor-unions.
44. See 2011 Wisconsin Act 10, Jan. 2011 Spec. Sess. (Wis. 2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of WIS. STAT. § 13 et seq.); see also Ian Saleh, Wisconsin Gov. Scott Walker signs collective
bargaining bill, bypasses Senate Democrats, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 11, 2011,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/11/AR2011031103966.html.
45. See Meghan Barr & Thomas J. Sheeran, Ohio Governor Signs Collective Bargaining Limits,
AOLNEWS.COM (Mar. 31, 2011, 8:15 PM), http://www.aolnews.com/2011/03/31/ohio-governor-johnkasich-signs-collective-bargaining-limits/. Ohio’s voters later repealed the measure. See also Rachel
Weiner, Issue 2 Falls, Ohio Collective Bargaining Law Repealed, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 8, 2011,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/issue-2-falls-ohio-collective-bargaining-lawrepealed/2011/11/08/gIQAyZ0U3M_blog.html; Ohio Repeals Measure to Limit Bargaining Rights, NPR
(Nov. 9, 2011, 3:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/2011/11/09/142184380/ohio-voters-repeal-measure-to-limitbargaining-rights.
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the latter being the first state to enact a “right-to-work” law in a decade.47 And as
dire as unions’ prospects have been in the states, they have been no brighter at the
federal level. Even when it has had ostensible Democratic Party allies in control of
both the White House and Congress, organized labor has been unable to push
through its legislative agenda.48 During and after the 2008 elections, labor unions
lobbied heavily for the Employee Free Choice Act, which would have required
employers to recognize unions based solely on signed authorization cards, as opposed to the standard election process.49 Although the newly elected President
Obama reiterated his support for the Act shortly after taking office, he quickly
abandoned it following electoral setbacks that cost his party its filibuster-proof majority in the Senate.50 This disappointment echoed organized labor’s unsuccessful
advocacy in the early 1990s in favor of the Workplace Fairness Act, which likewise
failed to pass under similarly favorable political conditions.51
Nor can unions expect a groundswell of public support to help them change
lawmakers’ minds. Far from lamenting organized labor’s collapse, more and more
Americans seem inclined to celebrate it. The public’s approval of unions crested in
the mid-twentieth century—the same period during which labor unions’ representation rates reached their peak.52 In January 1957, 75% of respondents told Gallup
pollsters that they approved of labor unions. 53 That percentage fell to 60% by
199154 and hit an all-time low in 2009, with only 48% saying they approved of unions.55 And while unions’ approval rates have marginally recovered in the few
years since then, they remain remarkably low by historical standards.56
Both declines—in labor’s representation rates and in its public approval—
neatly coincided with the rise of what we now call “employment law.” Generally,
46. See IND. CODE § 22-6-6-8 (West 2013).
47. Indiana enacts right-to-work law, CBSNEWS (Feb. 1, 2012, 5:27 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-57369868/indiana-enacts-right-to-work-law/. Indiana was also the
site of another recent union defeat, when in 2005 the state terminated its public employees’ collectivebargaining rights.
See Ind. Exec. Order No. 05-14 (Jan. 11, 2005), available at
http://www.in.gov/governorhistory/mitchdaniels/files/EO_05-14_Complaint_State_Employees.pdf
(rescinding prior executive order establishing collective-bargaining rights); see also Todd C. Dvorak, Heeding
“The Best of Prophets”: Historical Perspective and Potential Reform of Public Sector Collective Bargaining in Indiana, 85 IND. L.J. 701, 715 (2010).
48. William R. Corbett, “The More Things Change, . . .”: Reflections on the Stasis of Labor
Law in the United States, 56 VILL. L. REV. 227, 230–31 (2011) [hereinafter Corbett, The More Things
Change].
49. Id. at 230.
50. Id. at 230–31.
51. Id. at 228–29.
52. See Berks, supra note 31.
53. Jeffrey M. Jones, In U.S., Labor Union Approval Steady at 52%, GALLUP (Aug. 31, 2012),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/157025/labor-union-approval-steady.aspx.
54. Id.
55. Favorability Ratings of Labor Unions Fall Sharply, PEW RES. CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE &
THE PRESS (Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.people-press.org/2010/02/23/favorability-ratings-of-labor-unionsfall-sharply/ (reporting that only 41% of respondents expressed a favorable opinion toward unions).
56. Jones, supra note 53; see also Norimitsu Onishi, Changing Attitudes on Labor Color Bay
Area Transit Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/11/us/changingattitudes-on-labor-color-bay-area-transit-dispute.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (describing negative sentiment among working-class commuters toward striking public transit workers).
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when legal commentators use that term, they are referring to a patchwork of laws—
federal, state, and local statutes and regulations, as well as court-made common
law—that regulate the nonunionized workplace.57 Employment law is distinguishable from “labor law,” which principally concerns unions and their activities.58 As
unions (and, accordingly, labor law) have waned in importance, employment law
has stepped to the fore.59 The year 1963 saw the passage of the Equal Pay Act, 60 the
nation’s “first modern employment discrimination statute.”61 The next year, Congress enacted the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964,62 which, among other things,
prohibited certain forms of invidious employment discrimination. Other major federal employment statutes followed, such as the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (1967),63 the Employee Retirement Income Securities Act (1974),64 the Americans with Disabilities Act (1990),65 the Family Medical Leave Act (1993),66 the
Occupational Health and Safety Act (1994),67 and, more recently, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act (2009).68 State legislatures were also active during this period.69 At
minimum, most enacted their own anti-discrimination statutes, which often offered
broader protections than federal law. 70 State courts also contributed to employment
law’s expansion, abrogating the traditional employment-at-will doctrine with such

57. See, e.g., Corbett, Labor Law, supra note 4, at 263 (“‘Labor and employment law’ is what
we in the United States call the area of law dealing with legal regulation of the employment relationship.
Labor law is the name given to the law governing labor-management relations, primarily in unionized
workplaces. Employment law, on the other hand, is thought of as the body of law regulating principally
non-unionized workplaces.”) (footnotes omitted); see also Matthew T. Bodie, The Potential for State Labor
Law: The New York Greengrocer Code of Conduct, 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 183, 184 (2003) (“Employment law, on the other hand, describes those statutes, regulations, or common law doctrines which
cover employees individually.”).
58. Corbett, Labor Law, supra note 4, at 263.
59. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension Between
Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 575,
584 (1992) (“The past decade has witnessed a shift from a legal system that protects collective employee
rights to one that protects individual employment rights. In this shift, labor relations have been deregulated
and then reregulated in an individualized and decentralized fashion.”).
60. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006).
61. 1 MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 437 (2d ed. 1999).
62. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–e17 (2006).
63. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–31 (2006).
64. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–191c (2006).
65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–213 (2006).
66. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–54 (2006).
67. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–78 (2006).
68. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(A) (West 2013).
69. Berks, supra note 31, at 250 (“Beginning in the 1960s, . . . state lawmakers imposed restrictions on an employer’s right to discharge based on an employee’s race, gender, religion, age, and, most
recently, disability.”) (footnotes omitted).
70. Jarod S. Gonzales, State Antidiscrimination Statutes and Implied Preemption of Common
Law Torts: Valuing the Common Law, 59 S.C. L. REV. 115, 116 (2007) (“Some state antidiscrimination
statutes expand the categories of protected groups.” (citing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 354-A:1-25 (LexisNexis 1995 & Supp. 2006))); Stone, supra note 59, at 592 (“Some states have adopted more stringent
protection for the employment rights of minorities than has the federal government . . . .”). Some states also
enhanced their protections for whistleblowers. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii) (West 2013);
Stone, supra note 59, at 592 (noting that at least thirty-four states protect whistleblowers from retaliation
from their employer).
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doctrines as the handbook exception,71 the good-faith exception,72 and the publicpolicy exception.73
The causal relationship, if any, between employment law’s rise and labor
law’s fall is difficult to identify.74 On one hand, it seems logical that federal and
state lawmakers, in adopting these new legal protections, were reacting directly to
organized labor’s weakness.75 At one time, labor unions were seen as the primary
route through which employees could improve their wages, secure minimally acceptable working conditions, and protect themselves from arbitrary employer action.76 Early employment legislation throughout the nation reflected this understanding by aiming to expand and protect employees’ collective bargaining rights.77
But as unions declined, these rights hollowed out; workers were left exposed to the
whims of the market—and of their employers.78 Thus, it may be that courts and
71. See Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 540 N.W.2d 277, 282 (Iowa 1995) (explaining
that courts adopted doctrines such as the handbook exception to ameliorate the “perceived …harshness of
the employment-at-will doctrine”); Berks, supra note 31, at 234 (noting “a direct link among employer
handbooks, declining unionism and the new wrongful termination cause of action”).
72. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 391 n.26 (Cal. 1988) (citing cases).
73. See, e.g., Adams v. George W. Cochran & Co., 597 A.2d 28, 34 (D.C. 1991); Bowman v.
State Bank of Keysville, 331 S.E.2d 797, 801 (Va. 1985); Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 505
(N.J. 1980); Geary v. U.S. Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 180 (Pa. 1974); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
23-1501(A)(3)(c) (West 2013) (codifying public-policy cause of action); Berks, supra note 31 at 251
(“Simultaneously, common law courts developed a ‘public policy exception’ to the at-will rule.”); Stone,
supra note 59, at 591 (observing that at least thirty-nine states have enacted “some form of common law
employee protection against unjust dismissal”).
74. See Berks, supra note 31, at 260–61 (“The causes of union decline are numerous, multifaceted and the subject of extended scholarly debate.”).
75. See Corbett, The More Things Change, supra note 48, at 238 (arguing that “politicians of
both parties long ago gave up on labor law and opted for a regime of individual employment rights laws”);
Stone, supra note 59, at 576 (“There is a plausible argument that the newly emerging individual employment rights are an evolution of the pre-existing system of collective bargaining.”).
76. See John Godard & Carola Frege, Labor Unions, Alternative Forms of Representation, and
the Exercise of Authority Relations in U.S. Workplaces, 66 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 142, 143 (2013) (“In
the United States, labor unions have been widely viewed as the primary means by which workers can collectively achieve democratic rights and protections within the employment relation . . . .”); see also Berks,
supra note 31, at 259 (“The primary strategy for securing these benefits was direct negotiation and, when
necessary, direct action at the local level.”).
77. See National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (now codified at 29
U.S.C.A. § 151 (West 2013)) (passed in 1935, and finding that “protection by law of the right of employees
to organize and bargain collectively . . . encourage[es] practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of
industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and . . . restor[es] equality of bargaining power between employers and employees”); Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB,
380 U.S. 300, 316 (1965) (“[A] primary purpose of the National Labor Relations Act was to redress the
perceived imbalance of economic power between labor and management . . . by conferring certain affirmative rights on employees and by placing certain enumerated restrictions on the activities of employers.”);
Berks, supra note 31, at 245 (arguing that “[t]he passage of the NLRA was, in short, a ‘response’ by the
legal system to widespread discomfort with the at-will doctrine”); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Meeting the
Demands of Workers into the Twenty-First Century: The Future of Labor and Employment Law, 68 IND.
L.J. 685, 686–687 (1993) (explaining that Congress adopted the NLRA to “actively promote collective
bargaining as a method of addressing the needs of workers”) [hereinafter Dau-Schmidt, Meeting the Demands].
78. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1501(A)(2) (West 2013) (providing that, absent a
signed written contract, “[t]he employment relationship is severable at the pleasure of either the employee
or the employer”); Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 540 N.W.2d 277, 282 (Iowa 1995) (noting the
“universal acceptance of the employment-at-will doctrine”); Berks, supra note 31, at 234–35, 255 (arguing
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legislatures, recognizing the gap left by organized labor’s implosion, stepped in to
fill the void, acting to protect American workers as it became apparent that unions
could no longer do so.79
It is just as possible, however, that causation ran in the opposite direction;
perhaps new employment laws actually undermined labor unions by rendering
them redundant.80 After all, the initial wave of federal employment legislation preceded the worst of organized labor’s decline.81 Congress passed the Civil Rights
Act over a decade before labor’s disastrous 1975–85 span, when unionization rates
plummeted by almost a third.82 And, piece-by-piece, the legislative wave that followed began to afford all workers certain minimum protections, regardless of union
status.83 Workers no longer needed unions to combat certain discriminatory discharges, secure safe working conditions, obtain emergency medical leave, or protect their pension funds.84 State tort law also increasingly gave workers recourses
outside of the labor contract.85 Indeed, due to strong federal labor-law preemption,
non-union workers often had greater state employment-law rights than their unionized counterparts.86 In sum, unions no longer occupied an exclusive position in
that “the unprecedented decline in union density and influence at the end of the 1970s and beginning of the
1980s effectively eliminated collective bargaining as a genuine alternative to the at-will regime” and that
“this loss of union power created a due process void in the work place that was filled by the creation of a
common law cause of action for wrongful discharge within the framework of existing contract law”).
79. See Berks, supra note 31, at 253 (“Only when collective bargaining ceased to provide a viable alternative to the individualized employment contract did courts review and revise the employment-atwill rule.”).
80. See Godard & Frege, supra note 76, at 145 (arguing that “[i]t is . . . possible that a general
increase in legal employment rights has lessened the difference between union and nonunion workplaces
and hence the extent to which unions can be said to have democratization effects, regardless of whether a
management-established system is in place”); Stone, supra note 59, at 577 (observing that, despite the ways
in which individual-rights legislation might bolster unions’ bargaining position, they are at bottom in “tension” with “the New Deal system of collective bargaining”); Bodie, supra note 57, at 184 (“Many of these
statutes were passed in part due to strong support from unions. Some have argued, however, that these
successes in turn reduced the importance of unions to workers.”) (footnote omitted).
81. See Berks, supra note 31, at 255 (noting that union rates “fell from 29.9% in 1974 to 20.5%
in 1985”); see also 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006) (Equal Pay Act passed in 1963); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–e17
(2006) (Civil Rights Act of 1964).
82. Berks, supra note 31, at 255; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–e17 (2006) (Civil Rights Act of 1964).
83. See Godard & Frege, supra note 76, at 145 (reviewing scholarship that suggests that “a proliferation of employment legislation at the state and local levels (e.g., living wage laws) have led employers
to adopt standard personnel policies and practices and a new strategy centered on private arbitration procedures”).
84. See Berks, supra note 31, at 250 (“In one sense, therefore, the harshness of the employmentat-will rule served the institutional interest of organized labor. The legal recognition of collective bargaining
thereby reduced the likelihood that the at-will rule itself would face abolition.”) (footnote omitted).
85. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 219−20 (1985) (holding that in Wisconsin
a complaint in tort for breach of duty of good faith was preempted by § 301 of the NLRA and the applicable
collective bargaining agreement).
86. ABA SEC. LAB. & EMP. L., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT (Patrick Hardin et al. eds., 4th ed. 2001) (observing that “[s]ince
Allis-Chalmers, lower courts applying the standard in that case have held that Section 301 preempts claims
for fraud and misrepresentation, invasion of privacy, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
negligence, tortious drug testing, tortious interference with contract, violation of an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, fraud, violation of a worker compensation law, race and sex discrimination
under state law, breach of a trust agreement, breach of contract, and wages due.”) (footnotes omitted);
Stone, supra note 59, at 578 (“As a result [of federal labor-law preemption], unionized workers now have,
in many respects, fewer employment rights than do their nonunion brothers and sisters.”).
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regard to securing workplace rights; new employment laws had eroded their claim
to an essential role in the American workplace.
And as unions began to lose their grip on that claim, it should be no surprise
that employees abandoned in droves.87 Many employees tend to believe, not wholly
irrationally, that inviting a union into their workplace brings with it certain costs.88
For instance, many imagine (perhaps in response to management’s urgings) that
unionizing would put their employer’s very existence in jeopardy.89 Moreover, given the National Labor Relations Board’s notorious inability to quickly police unfair
labor practices,90 many employees legitimately fear retaliation for supporting a union.91 Such fears sharpen in times of economic scarcity, which may explain why the
public takes a dimmer view of unions during recessions.92 And, as noted, federal
preemption forces unionized workers to forgo certain state law protections—a cost
that employers make sure to inform their employees of.93 In light of these considerations, it is plausible that the rise of employment law as an alternative source of
rights contributed to organized labor’s decline.94 As employees had less need for
union representation, they simply grew less inclined to accept its costs. 95
But which of these causal theories is closer to the truth is ultimately less important than the end result, which is that the modern American workplace is in87. Benjamin I. Sachs, Labor Law Renewal, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 378 (2007) (“In response to these deep flaws in the traditional regime, both unions and employers have begun to abandon the
NLRA and the NLRB.”).
88. See Richard B. Freeman & Morris M. Kleiner, Do Unions Make Enterprises Insolvent?, 52
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 510, 511 (1999).
89. See id. (noting that “[a] 1988 Gallup Poll found that 35% of the population believed that union establishments are ‘much more likely to go out of business than nonunion establishments’ while 51%
disagreed. Among those who disapproved of unions, 45% reported that they believed unionized workplaces
are more likely to go out of business, a belief that may color their attitudes.”) (citation omitted); Let’s Go
German, supra note 41 (reporting on American carmakers’ higher labor costs and pension liabilities, which
were a factor in GM and Chrysler’s 2008 bankruptcy filings).
90. See, e.g., Sachs, supra note 87, at 375–77 (arguing that the NLRB’s inability to quickly redress violations is a factor driving employees and unions to abandon traditional enforcement avenues); Paul
C. Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1769, 1795–96 (1983) (noting that, despite a rise in the occurrence of employer unfair labor practices,
the average delay in obtaining an enforceable order from the NLRB was 1000 days dating back as far as
1980).
91. See Yungsuhn Park, The Immigrant Workers Union: Challenges Facing Low-Wage Immigrant Workers in Los Angeles, 12 ASIAN L.J. 67, 88 (2005) (noting that “[i]t is common for employers to
fire workers who support unionization, threaten to shutdown plants upon unionization, force workers to
attend anti-union presentations, and hire outside consultants to conduct anti-union campaigns.”) (footnote
omitted).
92. See David Madland & Karla Walter, Why is the Public Suddenly Down on Unions? The Bad
Economy’s to Blame—Support Should Recover When the Economy Does, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS
ACTION
FUND
(July
20,
2010),
http://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/labor/report/2010/07/20/8046/why-is-the-public-suddenlydown-on-unions/ (predicting that “public support for labor unions should recover when the economy improves.”).
93. Stone, supra note 59, at 643.
94. See Gary Minda & Katie R. Raab, Time for an Unjust Dismissal Statute in New York, 54
BROOK. L. REV. 1137, 1176 (1989) (noting that one of the arguments against unjust-discharge legislation is
that “[w]orkers will be less inclined to join labor organizations if they are provided with the same protection
under a statute that unions offer under collective bargaining agreements.”) (footnote omitted).
95. See id.
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creasingly governed by employment law, not labor law. 96 With every passing day,
unions seem more irrelevant, while employment law grows in importance.97
Indeed, employees have already begun adjusting to this reality, creatively using employment law as a labor law substitute.98 For instance, in 2001, garment
workers at Danmar Finishing in New York protested their employer’s failure to pay
accrued overtime wages.99 When Danmar retaliated by terminating one of the lead
advocates, the employees did not, as might be expected, seek an unfair-laborpractice injunction from the National Labor Relations Board.100 Instead, using the
Fair Labor Standards Act’s anti-retaliation provisions, they obtained a temporary
restraining order in federal court.101 As a result, the terminated employee was reinstated, and the lobbying efforts continued uninterrupted.102 These tactics ultimately
succeeded with the employees extracting more than $400,000 in unpaid overtime.103
State and local regulators have also turned to employment law as an organized-labor substitute.104 One such example occurred in 2002 when, in response to
widespread wage-law violations, New York City adopted the Greengrocer Code of
Conduct.105 The Code was a voluntary settlement agreement between the city and
local greengrocers, establishing certain minimum terms of employment. 106 These
terms included minimum standards for wages, overtime, and sick leave. 107 The
Code has been described as “an off-the-rack collective bargaining agreement that
provides a state seal of approval,” and has been held out as a model for other states
and localities.108
But these successes, however encouraging, do not suggest that the transition
from labor law to employment law has been well planned, or even coherent.109 Rather, modern employment law is not the product of a single national policy, but of
federal, state, and local actors moving with often overlapping or contradictory purposes.110 Whereas one consequence of the federal preemption doctrine in the labor-

96. See Stone, supra note 59, at 593 (“[T]he emerging regime of individual employee rights represents not a complement to or an embellishment of the regime of collective rights, but rather its replacement.”).
97. Bodie, supra note 57, at 184 (arguing that, in the wake of labor unions’ decline, “the importance of employment law has only increased, and the aspects of the employment relationship covered by
such individually-oriented provisions have continued to climb.”) (footnote omitted).
98. See Sachs, supra note 87, at 391–92.
99. Id. (citing Rosemary Feitelberg, N.Y. Senator Criticizes Dept. of Labor Efforts, WOMEN’S
WEAR DAILY, May 13, 2002, at 23; Bob Port, Schumer Rips Sweatshops: B’klyn Case Sparks Call for Fed
Probe of City Factories, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 10, 2002, at 10).
100. Id. at 392.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 393.
104. See Bodie, supra note 57, at 185–86.
105. Id.; see also Summary of Greengrocer Code of Conduct, OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN., ST. OF
N.Y., http://www.oag.state.ny.us/sites/default/files/pdfs/bureaus/labor/final_ggcode_english_short.pdf (last
visited Nov. 17, 2013).
106. Bodie, supra note 57, at 194 – 95.
107. Id. at 195.
108. Id. at 186.
109. See Drummonds, supra note 42, at 99.
110. See Sachs, supra note 87, at 377.
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law field was the creation of a single, monolithic body of law,111 no such national
policy yet exists in the employment-law field. Rather, employment law has grown
in fits and starts, with legislatures and courts approaching workplace regulation in a
piecemeal fashion.112 As a result, wide variations can be seen in the rights that employees enjoy in different states.113 Compare, for example, Montana, where employers may not terminate their employees but for good cause, 114 and Texas, where
employers can fire with impunity,115 and are not even required to carry workers’
compensation insurance.116
Yet despite the transition’s lack of direction, there are reasons to believe that
the new employment law regime can improve upon its labor law predecessor. Theoretically, by focusing more on individual rights than collective remedies, employment law may better fit the modern workplace. These potential benefits are the
subject of this Article’s next section.
II
Unions have lost their sway over the American workplace. 117 As detailed in
Part I, Americans increasingly no longer look to collective bargaining agreements
as the primary source of their employment rights, but rather to a patchwork of federal, state, and local employment laws. 118 Particularly in the private sector, employees are increasingly less beholden to collective resolutions, but increasingly more
reliant on external legal rights.119 Theoretically, this could be a positive development. While the employment-law approach is not perfect, its focus on individual
rights over collective solutions promises substantial advantages—for both workers
and employers.120 Those potential advantages are the subject of this section.
To begin, the employment-law approach is potentially cheaper than collective
bargaining.121 It saves all parties involved at least one obvious cost: bargainingassociated expenses.122 Electing a union and negotiating a collective bargaining
agreement can be expensive endeavors, for both employers and employees.123 But
111. Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REV. 967,
972 (2002) (arguing that federal preemption of state common law promotes “doctrinal clarity”); but see
Drummonds, supra note 42, at 99 (arguing that, although “federal labor relations preemption doctrines
ensnarl all states in a stifling and exclusive . . . federal labor law regime,” that regime is itself “strikingly
inconsistent”) (footnote omitted).
112. See Sachs, supra note 87, at 377 (“No longer a regime defined by a single federal statute
administered by a single federal agency, American labor law is increasingly constituted by private processes, by state and local regulation, and by multiple federal statutes enforced by multiple actors.”).
113. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(1)(b) (West 2013); see also TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §
406.002 (West 2013).
114. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(1)(b) (West 2013).
115. See, e.g., E. Line & R.R.R. Co. v. Scott, 10 S.W. 99, 102 (Tex. 1888).
116. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.002 (West 2013).
117. See supra Part I.
118. See supra Part I.
119. See supra Part I.
120. See infra Part II.
121. See Dau-Schmidt, Meeting the Demands, supra note 77, at 693–94.
122. See id.
123. Id. at 694.
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under the employment-law approach, minimum wages, overtime pay, sick and annual leave, workplace safety, and various other terms are dictated uniformly by
statute.124 Accordingly, the parties need not employ bargaining proxies, nor need
they incur union-election and CBA-enforcement expenses.125 While they still need
to negotiate the remaining employment terms on a case-by-case basis, these individual negotiations are usually more informal and efficient than collective ones.126
Thus, under the employment-law approach, employees still enjoy certain CBA-like
rights, while both parties are freed from the costs traditionally associated with bargaining for and implementing a CBA.127
The employment-law approach may also be more stable and predictable. For
employers, uniform employment standards—applicable across employers, industries, and regions—establish a baseline.128 When this baseline is set by legislation,
as opposed to collective bargaining, employers can more accurately forecast their
labor costs in any given region of the country. For example, employers know that
in any state in the country, they will have to pay their employees at least $7.25 an
hour.129 They also know that they must allow their employees a certain amount of
emergency medical leave,130 pay them time and a half for overtime,131 and accommodate their disabilities.132 Employers can account for these expenses in advance
without needing to consult or bargain with a local union. Of course, many states
provide employees with greater rights than they enjoy under federal law.133 For
example, a number of states set their minimum wages higher than the federal
rate.134 Nevertheless, while baseline costs may vary between jurisdictions, those
costs are predictable; no local negotiation is necessary.
Employees also benefit from this predictability. When moving between employers, regions, or industries, employees carry their baseline rights with them.135
For example, under the FMLA, a mail clerk in Texas has the same right to emergency medical leave as a sales representative in New Jersey.136 In theory, this predictability should make it easier for employees to shift between jobs and regions,
124. See id. at 686–88.
125. See id. at 696.
126. See id. at 688–89 (explaining that “individual bargaining allows the parties to achieve a customized or personalized solution to individual desires or problems” and may “result in the maximization of
total wealth”).
127. See Stone, supra note 59, at 636 (“If the emerging system of individual employment rights
does in fact provide universal employment rights, then it is plausible that most workers would benefit by
dispensing with collective bargaining altogether.”).
128 . KENNETH G. DAU-SCHMIDT ET AL., LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW AND ECONOMICS 708
(2009).
129. 29 U.S.C.§ 206(a)(1)(C) (2006).
130. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D) (2006).
131. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2006).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2006).
133. Ken LaMance, State vs. Federal Laws for Employment Discrimination, LEGALMATCH (Apr.
8, 2013, 2:42 PM), http://www.legalmatch.com/law-library/article/state-vs-federal-laws-for-employmentdisputes.html (listing differences between state and federal laws in regards to: right-to-work laws and safety-and-health laws).
134. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 408.384 (West 2013) (minimum wage is $7.40 an
hour); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151 § 1 (West 2013) (minimum wage is $8.00 an hour).
135. See Summary of the Major Laws of the Department of Labor, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB.,
http://www.dol.gov/opa/aboutdol/lawsprog.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2013).
136. 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (a)(1) (2006).
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adding liquidity to the labor market.137 This predictability benefits not only migrating workers, but also employees who remain in a single job for decades. These career employees enjoy peace of mind, knowing that certain basic rights are not upfor-grabs at the expiration of the present CBA; statutory rights are not subject to
bargaining givebacks.138
The employment-law approach also levels the playing field between union
and nonunion employers. For example, unionized employers tend to face higher
labor costs than their nonunion competitors.139 Unionization may also cause employers to behave inefficiently; for instance, by firing productive employees because of their union sympathies.140 These factors leave unionized employers at a
competitive disadvantage with their nonunion competitors.141 But when uniformly
applicable law, rather than collective bargaining, establishes baseline employment
standards, such disparities should disappear. Employers cannot argue that higher
standards—established by legislation rather than collective bargaining—render
them uncompetitive with one another. 142 When all employers must meet the same
137. See Jason Long & Joseph Ferrie, Labour Mobility, in 3 OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ECONOMIC HISTORY 248, 248 (Joel Mokyr et al. eds., 2003) (“[L]abour mobility conveys important economic benefits. The reallocation of workers across regions permits the exploitation of complementary resources as they are discovered in new places, while reallocation across sectors makes possible the use of
new technologies and the growth of new industries.”).
138. Holly Otterbein, Teachers’ Union Still Reluctant on Salary Givebacks, NEWSWORKS (June
25, 2013), http://www.newsworks.org/index.php/local//the-latest/56498-teachers-union-still-reluctant-onsalary-givebacks (describing Philadelphia School District’s attempts to obtain salary “give-backs” from
teachers’ union at expiration of CBA); Kate Taylor, Health Care Law Raises Pressure on Public Unions,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/05/nyregion/health-care-law-raises-pressureon-public-employees-unions.html?_r=1&hp=&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1375704672saUPISPHyt1CCK8QMXv8Dw (detailing negotiations between teachers union in Orange County, California, and local government officials, in which unions were forced to accept greater out-of-pocket health-care
expenses).
139. Dale Belman & Paula B. Voos, Union Wages and Union Decline: Evidence from the Construction Industry, 60 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 67, 67 (2006); see also BLS: Union Members, supra note
38 (noting that “among full-time wage and salary workers, union members had median usual weekly earnings of $943, while those who were not union members had median weekly earnings of $742.”). Admittedly, there is some evidence to suggest that union employees are more productive than nonunion employees,
which may offset higher compensation rates. See Charles Fried, Individual and Collective Rights in Work
Relations: Reflections on the Current State of Labor Law and Its Prospects, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1012, 1022
(1984) (citing R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? 162–80 (1984)). But this increased
productivity could be attributable to factors other than unionization itself. For instance, regions where labor
laws are favorable to unions may also enjoy better public infrastructure or a better-educated labor pool.
Indeed, that employers resist unionization so strongly itself indicates that unions do not “pay for
themselves” with productivity increases. See Belman & Voos, supra note 139, at 67 (“Some economists
view high union/nonunion wage differentials as one factor contributing to both loss of existing union jobs
and intense opposition by management to new union organization.”). If unionization is essentially a wash
for the employer, or if it actually increases net productivity, then only an irrational employer would oppose
unionization. Yet, most employers do so. See Richard A. Epstein, The Employee No Choice Act, CHIEF
EXECUTIVE.NET (Dec. 12, 2008), http://chiefexecutive.net/the-employee-nochoice-act.
140. Dau-Schmidt, Meeting the Demands, supra note 77, at 693.
141. Id.
142. See Steven Greenhouse, Fighting Back Against Wretched Wages, N.Y. TIMES, July 27,
2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/28/sunday-review/fighting-back-against-wretchedwages.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (“Caterpillar’s chief executive, Douglas Oberhelman . . . says the freeze
was vital to keep wages competitive with rival companies.”) [hereinafter Greenhouse, Fighting Back];
James Sherk, The Union Difference: A Primer on What Unions Do to the Economy, CAP. RES. CENTER
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minimum standards, none are left arbitrarily disadvantaged against lower-cost
peers.
Only national legislation, however, can achieve this type of leveling.143 When
raising employment standards, the biggest hurdle individual states and localities
must overcome is the risk that they will drive employers into the arms of their more
forgiving neighbors.144 Washington D.C.’s recent experience is illustrative. In the
summer of 2013, the D.C. City Council passed the Large Retailer Accountability
Act of 2013,145 which would have required certain “big-box” stores to pay their
employees a 50% premium over the city’s standard minimum wage. 146 The council
was concerned with high poverty rates in D.C., as well as with a wide income gap
between minimum-wage earners and the general population.147 Also, the council
was motivated in no small part by the pending arrival of Walmart;148 which, at the
time, had announced plans to open six stores in the district.149 Walmart protested
the act even before it passed150 and moved swiftly to condemn the council’s action
after its adoption.151 The retailer immediately announced it would shelve three of
its six planned stores and would explore its options for closing the others.152 Mayor
Gray Davis ultimately caved to Walmart’s pressure, vetoing the act.153
It should come as no surprise that D.C. backed down; Walmart’s threat to
abandon its planned stores in the city was hardly an idle one. National chains like
(Jan. 3, 2012), http://capitalresearch.org/2012/01/the-union-difference-a-primer-on-what-unions-do-to-theeconomy/ (arguing that General Motors’ and Chrysler’s high labor costs rendered them uncompetitive with
foreign automakers, resulting in bankruptcy for both companies).
143. See Paul Winters, BIO Applauds Bipartisan Legislation That Levels the Playing Field for
Renewable Chemicals, BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY ORG. (Sept. 12, 2013)........................................... ,
http://www.bio.org/media/press-release/bio-applauds-bipartisan-legislation-levels-playing-field-renewablechemicals (discussing how proposed legislation changing U.S. tax policy “creat[e] a level playing field” for
industrial biotech companies).
144. See Liz Fiel. ds, California to Raise Minimum Wage to $10 by 2016, ABC NEWS (Sept. 15,
2013), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/california-raise-minimum-wage-10-2016/story?id=20258394 (The
California Chamber of Commerce claimed legislation to raise the minimum wage in California to $10 per
hour was “a job killer.”).
145. D.C. Council, B20-0062, Large Retailer Accountability Act of 2013 (July 10, 2013) (vetoed
Sept. 12, 2013), available at http://dcclims1.dccouncil.us/images/00001/20130122132700.pdf.
146. Mike DeBonis, D.C. Council Approves ‘Living Wage’ Bill Over Wal-Mart Ultimatum,
WASHINGTON POST, July 10, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-07-10/local/40487421_1_walmart-spokesman-steven-restivo-minimum-wage-retail-giant [hereinafter DeBonis, D.C. Council Approves].
147. COUNCIL OF THE D.C. COMM.ON BUS. CONSUMER AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, REPORT ON
BILL 20-62 “LARGE RETAILER ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2013” (2013), available at
http://dcclims1.dccouncil.us/images/00001/20130709155130.pdf (federal poverty level for single person
households is higher in D.C. than anywhere else in the country).
148. Walmart in Washington, D.C.: Welcome to the Capital, THE ECONOMIST (July 17, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2013/07/walmart-washington-dc
[hereinafter
Walmart in Washington].
149. Mike DeBonis, Wal-Mart Says it Will Pull out of D.C. Plans Should City Mandate ‘Living
Wage’, WASHINGTON POST, July 9, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/wal-mart-saysit-will-pull-out-of-dc-plans-should-city-mandate-living-wage/2013/07/09/4fa7e710-e8d0-11e2-a301ea5a8116d211_print.html.
150. See id.
151. See DeBonis, D.C. Council Approves, supra note 146.
152. Id.
153. Mike DeBonis, D.C. Mayor Gray Vetoes ‘Living Wage’ Bill Aimed at Wal-Mart, Setting Up
Decisive Council Vote, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 12, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dcpolitics/mayor-gray-vetoes-living-wage-bill-aimed-at-wal-mart-setting-up-decisive-councilvote/2013/09/12/664d7310-077d-11e3-a07f-49ddc7417125_story.html?wpmk=MK0000200.
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Walmart can easily take their investment elsewhere, and individual states and localities have no good way to stop them. Thus, state and local governments are stuck. If
they adopt higher standards, employers will flee to more forgiving jurisdictions; but
if they lower their standards to attract businesses, their constituents are left vulnerable to abuse. It would not, however, be productive to blame the employers for
their lack of public mindedness. Many employers are corporations, which exist not
for the betterment of the public at large, but to enrich their shareholders. 154 In light
of that purpose, forum shopping in search of looser regulations is only rational;
lawmakers cannot, and should not, expect corporations to act against their shareholders’ interests. Employers will react to the incentives the law provides. Accordingly, the only way to prevent this type of flight-to-laxity—and thus the only way
to effectively level the playing field among all employers—is to adopt standards at
a national level, so as to remove the incentive to relocate between jurisdictions.
Relatedly, the employment-law approach not only eliminates disparities between employers, it also eliminates them between workers. In isolation, the wage
gap between union and nonunion employees is difficult to justify. If employees
deserve certain benefits, it is not because they are owed something as a matter of
natural law, but because they contribute to an enterprise’s overall productivity.155
And employees’ contribution has little or nothing to do with their willingness to
organize and bargain collectively. 156 Accordingly, whether employees receive a
living wage, enjoy fair working conditions, or have protection from arbitrary discharge, should not depend on whether they choose to elect a union.157 The employment-law approach ameliorates this unjustified distinction by providing all
employees with minimum rights and benefits, regardless of union status.
To be sure, the benefits just described are largely theoretical; none is a given.
And indeed, there are several potential downsides, many of which are just as plausible as the potential benefits. Most obviously, the employment-law approach suffers from the same deficiency as any top-down policymaking solution: it lacks flexibility. Legislators crafting new employment laws are necessarily detached from the
workplaces they aim to regulate. And by definition, uniform rules and regulations
fail to account for individual circumstances. Uniformity is the antonym of diversity,
which is the close relation of flexibility. Thus, in practice, it is very difficult for a
statute to both confer employment rights on all workers across great swaths of the
economy while still permitting adjustments for individual conditions.158 Any divergence from the general standard necessarily sacrifices some measure of uniformity.

154. See Ian B. Lee, Efficiency and Ethics in the Debate About Shareholder Primacy, 31 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 533, 534 (2006) (noting the “nearly overwhelming chorus of academic voices has endorsed
‘shareholder primacy,’ the view that managers’ fiduciary duties require them to maximize the shareholders’
wealth and preclude them from giving independent consideration to the interests of other constituencies”).
155. See Fried, supra note 139, at 1021–22.
156. See id. at 1022.
157. See id.
158. Stone, supra note 59, at 637 (arguing that statutorily mandated minimum terms “are too uniform and rigid to address the preferences of employees at all workplaces; they cannot accommodate local
differences”).
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So, if uniformity is crucial to attain the benefits just described (e.g., leveling the
playing field, providing predictability), flexibility must suffer.
Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination nicely illustrates this tradeoff.
For example, in 2003, the Nevada Department of Corrections (hereinafter the
NDC) launched an investigation at the Southern Nevada Women’s Correctional
Facility after learning that a guard had impregnated one of the inmates. 159 The investigation revealed “an uninhibited sexual environment” in the prison: guards had
flirted with inmates, gone missing from their posts for long periods throughout the
day, and “f[allen] prey to . . . inappropriate activities.”160 They had even exchanged
contraband, such as jewelry, cosmetics, alcohol, and narcotics, for sex.161 The investigation also uncovered widespread failure by the prison’s supervisory personnel
to detect and prevent these practices.162 In response, the NDC took over responsibility for staffing the prison and announced a new personnel policy. 163 Under this
policy, at least seventy percent of the prison’s front-line personnel were required to
be women, and three supervisory positions would be restricted to women only.164
Male correctional officers challenged the policy with the EEOC, and later in federal
court.165 They argued that by making three supervisory positions available only to
women, the NDC discriminated on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII.166
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed. It rejected the NDC’s attempt to defend its new policy as a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ), as
the NDC failed to satisfy the exacting standard for establishing such a defense.167
To establish a BFOQ, an employer must prove, among other things, either (a) “it
has a substantial basis for believing that all or nearly all [men] lack the [relevant]
qualification,” or (b) “it is impossible or highly impractical . . . to insure by individual testing that its employees will have the necessary qualifications for the
job.”168 The NDC, the court held, had not established either point. First, the NDC
had failed to show that no men, or very few men, would qualify for the supervisory
positions, as there was “no basis in fact[] for believing that individuals in [those
positions] are particularly likely to sexually abuse inmates.”169 Second, it failed to
show that other methods, such as background checks and prompt investigations,
would be ineffective to weed out men who were likely to commit such offenses.170
Accordingly, the NDC could not defend its policy as a BFOQ, and its exclusion of
men amounted to unlawful discrimination under Title VII.171

159. Breiner v. Nevada Dep’t of Corr., No. 2:05-CV-01412-KJD-RJJ, 2009 U.S. Dist. WL
367501, at *1 (D. Nev. Feb. 9, 2009), rev’d 610 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Harrison Ford, Unlawful to Exclude Men From Jobs in Women’s Prison, 17 ARIZ. EMP’T LAW LETTER 7 (2010).
160. Breiner, 2009 WL 367501, at *1.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1–2.
163. Id. at 2.
164. Id.
165. Breiner v. Nevada Dep’t of Corr., 610 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2010).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1211.
168. Id. at 1210.
169. Id. at 1211 (internal citation and original alterations omitted).
170. Breiner, 610 F.3d at 1215.
171. Id. at 1216.
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The Ninth Circuit’s final analysis may have been correct. Perhaps the NDC’s
policy was simply the product of lazy thinking, based on “assumptions of the comparative employment characteristics of men in general,”172 rather than on hard evidence or the NDC’s real-world needs. Nevertheless, the court’s ruling aptly demonstrates the risks involved in applying uniform employment rules across broad
swaths of the labor market. The NDC was, after all, proceeding on a facially rational assumption: male guards are more likely to sexually abuse female inmates than
female guards, so staffing the prison with women was likely to reduce the occurrence of such assaults.173 But because Title VII prohibits basing employment decisions on such assumptions, the NDC was denied a potentially useful heuristic for
solving its problem.174 Thus, while the statute’s ban on sex discrimination is surely
justified in most contexts, it can block the use of sex as an efficient sorting mechanism. While this effect will inevitably make more sense in some circumstances than
in others, Title VII allows little flexibility to account for differing circumstances.
Yet this same example also illustrates why uniform standards are often necessary. Yes, Title VII limits employers’ ability to consider sex as a criterion in employment decisions,175 even when doing so might be efficient. But that is a price
society gladly pays to eliminate sex discrimination. Even after Title VII’s adoption,
employers continued to offer spurious justifications for their discriminatory practices, including customer preferences,176 concern for women’s reproductive systems,177 and cultural norms.178 If the statute had given employers too much flexibility, then some or all of these justifications might have succeeded. But, because the
rule is rigid and uniform, courts rejected what were, at their core, the products of
“stereotypic impressions of male and female roles.”179 Thus, uniformity and rigidity
helped achieve the statute’s goal: eliminating invidious sex discrimination from the
workplace.180 It sacrificed flexibility for efficacy.
While this loss of flexibility is a legitimate concern,181 no approach is perfect,
even in the abstract. There will inevitably be theoretical, as well as practical, problems in applying any model with a goal as ambitious as regulating the entire American workplace. Whether the employment-law approach’s problems outweigh its
benefits is ultimately a values question. Do we, as a society, prefer collective in-

172. Id. at 1216 (original alteration and quotation marks omitted).
173. Id. at 1210–11.
174. Id. at 1216.
175. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2013).
176. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971).
177. Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 206 (1991).
178. Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1981).
179. Id.
180. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. S. Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 1971).
181. For other criticism of the employment-law approach, see, e.g., Stone, supra note 59, at 637
(criticizing the individual-rights approach on the ground that it “does not allow employees to participate in
corporate decisionmaking”); see also Corbett, Labor Law, supra note 4, at 264 (arguing that “[w]hile the
proliferation of [individual-rights laws] is not inherently bad, [those laws] are not likely to assure most
workers that they will have a workplace where they feel that they can perform their jobs safely and be treated in a fair and dignified manner by their supervisors and co-workers”).
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volvement or individual autonomy? Flexibility or predictability? A level playing
field or survival of the lowest-cost provider?
These are interesting and difficult questions. But, as a practical matter, they
are irrelevant. Organized labor has shown no signs of a revival, and the employment-law approach appears to be here to stay. The question, then, is whether modern employment law has, in practice, adequately replaced the old collectivebargaining approach. That is, does modern employment law provide employees
with satisfactory wages and working conditions, protect them from abuse, and
compensate them for their relative lack of bargaining power? And if not, what
should be done to shore up employment law’s deficiencies?
III
As discussed in Part II, the employment-law approach offers certain theoretical advantages over the old collective-bargaining model.182 Workers and employers
enjoy some of the same benefits the old model offered (e.g., fair wages and benefits, stability) without its peculiar costs (e.g., bargaining expenses, an unequal playing field).183 But theory is one thing, practice is another. And in practice, workers
today, lacking collective representation, are largely exposed to the whims of market
forces.184 Employment law does not guarantee workers a living wage, prohibit certain forms of invidious discrimination, or protect against arbitrary discharge.185
These weaknesses are significant, but not insurmountable. And if employment law
is ever to offer employees the type of comprehensive protection that unions once
did,186 lawmakers must recognize and confront these weaknesses.
A good place to begin this confrontation is employment law’s lack of any
comprehensive protection against arbitrary discharge. 187 Federal and state laws
shield employees from discharge on certain grounds, but those grounds are narrow.188 For instance, Title VII protects workers from discharge based only on race,
sex, religion, and national origin. 189 The ADA and ADEA protect disabled an
d elderly workers in a similar fashion,190 and other federal laws protect members of the armed forces.191 State anti-discrimination statutes add some additional

182. See supra Part II. pp. 12.
183. See supra Part II. pp. 12.
184. Cf. Stone, supra note 59, at 591 (observing that, presently, “the United States government
provides only minimal insurance against unemployment, retirement, or disability,” and arguing that, in
comparison to some European countries, “American workers exist in an unmediated, unregulated labor
market.”).
185. Id.
186. Dau-Schmidt, Meeting the Demands, supra note 77, at 691–92 (arguing that effective “unions can prevent employer strategic behavior” and counterbalance the employer’s “monopsony in the labor
market”).
187. See Berks, supra note 31, at 250–251.
188. Id. at 250 (“Unlike the just cause provisions of collective bargaining agreements, however,
these statutes prohibited only those discharges motivated by specific prohibited criteria.”).
189. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).
190. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2012).
191. E.g., Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 38 U.S.C.
§§ 4301–4307 (2012); 41 C.F.R. § 60–300.21(a) (2007).
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protected classes to the mix.192 As a last resort, some states’ common law provides
a public-policy tort, which permits workers fired in a manner that conflicts with
clearly defined state policies to file suit.193 But outside the closely proscribed limits,
employers are still free to discharge, demote, or refuse to hire employees for essentially any reason.194 Modern employment law offers nothing like the comprehensive protection a typical collectively-bargained, for-cause discharge clause would
offer. Thus, the vast majority of American workers, unprotected by such a clause,
remain vulnerable to discharge for an arbitrary or frivolous reason—or indeed, no
reason at all.
This type of capricious dismissal is particularly a problem in low-wage, transient jobs, such as jobs in the food-service industry.195 Consider, for instance, the
experience of Heriberto, a former food-preparation worker at Urasawa, an upscale
restaurant in Beverly Hills.196 According to one news report, Heriberto worked long
hours—up to sixty hours per week—for little pay.197 He earned between $9.00 and
$11.50 an hour, was not paid overtime, and was even required to purchase his own
set of $700 knives.198 Then, in June of 2012, nine hours into a shift, he began coming down with a fever.199 When he asked to go home, the restaurant’s proprietor
fired him on the spot.200 Or consider Marina, a young mother, who worked as a
cashier at a taqueria.201 Only four weeks after giving birth to her fourth child, she
returned to work, taking night shifts because she shared child-care duties with her
partner and could not afford day care.202 During her break, Marina breastfed her
new infant.203 When her manager found out that she had done this, he informed her

192. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 2-1402.11 (2013) (prohibiting discrimination based on marital status,
personal appearance, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, family responsibilities, genetic information, disability, matriculation, and political affiliation); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4 (West
2013) (outlawing discrimination based on gender identity, sexual orientation, genetic information, and
ancestry).
193. See, e.g., VanBuren v. Grubb, 733 S.E.2d 919, 924 (Va. 2012); Ballinger v. Del. River Port
Auth., 800 A.2d 97, 108 (N.J. 2002).
194. See, e.g., Myers v. Alutiiq Int’l Solutions, LLC, 811 F. Supp. 2d 261, 266 (D.D.C. 2011)
(explaining that, under District of Columbia law, “‘[a]n employee who serves at the will of his or her employer may be discharged ‘at any time and for any reason, or for no reason at all.’” (quoting Liberatore v.
Melville Corp., 168 F.3d 1326, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1999)); Berks, supra note 31, at 250–51 (“Even individuals
expressly protected by federal and state civil rights legislation could still be fired for ‘good reason, bad
reason, or no reason at all’ so long as the termination was not specifically motivated by the employee’s
status as a member of a protected class.”) (footnote omitted).
195. Jennifer Medina, At an Upscale Beverly Hills Restaurant, Claims of Underpaying Workers,
N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/us/at-an-upscale-beverly-hills-restaurantclaims-of-underpaying-workers.html?_r=0.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Stephanie Bornstein, Poor, Pregnant, and Fired: Caregiver Discrimination Against LowWage Workers, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, HASTINGS C. OF THE L.: CENTER FOR WORK LIFE L. 8 (2011),
http://worklifelaw.org/pubs/PoorPregnantAndFired.pdf.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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that she was prohibited from nursing her child during breaks. 204 He told her that she
would be allowed to return to work only after she no longer needed to breastfeed
the child.205 Marina protested, telling the manager that she needed the work. Instead
of accommodating Marina, the manager fired her. 206 National employment law, as
it exists today, offers employees like Marina and Heriberto little protection against
this type of capricious discharge, wholly unrelated to their job performance or the
employer’s legitimate business interests.
Employment law has also fallen short of securing adequate wages for a large
swath of the American workforce. Federal law has established a floor for wages
since 1938,207 which Congress has raised periodically over the intervening decades.208 The last such raise occurred in 2007, bringing the minimum to $7.25 an
hour.209 But despite that increase, as of February 2013,210 the minimum wage’s
purchasing power had declined by roughly a third from its historical peak in
1968.211 Yet during the same period, worker productivity steadily increased.212 If
the minimum wage had kept pace with productivity, it would have reached $21.72
per hour in 2012.213 And, contrary to some assertions,214 the minimum wage’s failure to keep up with inflation, let alone productivity, doesn’t just hurt teenagers. As
of 2011, 1.7 million Americans earned exactly the applicable minimum wage, and
another 2.2 million earned less than the minimum.215 Although these wages left
them well below the poverty line, 216 more than half of those Americans were trying
to support families.217 This problem isn’t going away; the minimum wage’s erosion
will affect more and more workers over the coming decade. Of the ten occupations
expected to add the most jobs by 2020, six fall toward the lower end of the pay
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C.A. § 206 (West 2013).
208. William P. Quigley, ‘A Fair Day’s Pay for a Fair Day’s Work’: Time to Raise and Index the
Minimum Wage, 27 ST. MARY’S L.J. 513, 544 n.141 (1996).
209. U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-28, § 8102(b), 121 Stat. 112 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206
(2012)).
210. See The U.S. ranks 10th in purchasing power of minimum wage, RANKING AMERICA (Feb.
23, 2013), http://rankingamerica.wordpress.com/2013/02/23/the-u-s-ranks-10th-in-purchasing-power-ofminimum-wage/.
211. See John Schmitt, The Minimum Wage Is Too Damn Low, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC AND
POLICY RESEARCH, 1 (Mar. 2012), http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/min-wage1-2012-03.pdf
[hereinafter Schmitt, The Minimum Wage]; see also Annalyn Kurtz, A history of the minimum wage since
1938,
CNNMONEY.COM
(Feb.
14,
2013,
10:24
AM),
http://economy.money.cnn.com/2013/02/14/minimum-wage-history/.
212. Schmitt, The Minimum Wage, supra note 211.
213. Id.
214. See James Sherk, Who Earns the Minimum Wage? Suburban Teenagers, Not Single Parents,
THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/02/who-earnsthe-minimum-wage-suburban-teenagers-not-single-parents (asserting that “[m]ost minimum wage workers .
. . are not poor.”).
215. See Characteristics of Minimum Wage Workers: 2011, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (2012),
http://www.bls.gov/cps/minwage2011.htm.
216. See id.
217. Rick Unger, The Minimum Wage Fight—Ground Zero In The Clash Of Conservatives vs.
Progressive
America,
FORBES.COM
(Feb.
16,
2013,
12:02
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/rickungar/2013/02/16/the-minimum-wage-fight-ground-zero-in-the-clash-ofconservative-vs-progressive-america/.
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scale;218 and in the most recent economic recovery, 58% of all job growth has occurred in low-wage sectors.219
More broadly, employment law has also failed to carry organized labor’s
torch in terms of ameliorating the bargaining-power disparity between employees
and employers. Without unions to counter their bargaining strength, employers
have predictably pressed their advantage as far as the law allows.220 And in states
that have taken a hands-off approach to workplace regulation, employees are left in
an untenable position.
In this regard, Texas is a prime offender. The Lone Star State is a right-towork state, making union organizing especially difficult.221 Texas also does not
require employers to pay wages above the federal minimum, 222 and is the only state
in the country that does not require all employers to carry workers’ compensation
insurance.223 These conditions have, unsurprisingly, led to abuses, particularly in
the construction industry.224 A 2009 report225 by the Workers Defense Project detailed unsavory practices among contractors in the Austin area, including wage
theft, misclassification of employees as independent contractors, and the failure to
carry workers’ compensation insurance. 226 These abuses were widespread.227 Fortyfive percent of workers reported that their employers did not provide workers’
compensation coverage, while 21% had been injured on the job.228 Twenty percent
of these injured workers also reported that their employers refused to pay for their
medical treatment.229 And almost half had been earning poverty-level wages to
begin with, making it unlikely that they could afford to pay for treatment out-ofpocket.230

218. See Occupations with the largest job growth, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (Feb. 1, 2012),
http://www.bls.gov/emp/ep_table_104.htm; see also Fast-Food Fight, N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/08/opinion/fast-food-fight.html?_r=0.
219. Jennifer Gordon, Subcontractor Servitude, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/opinion/subcontractor-servitude.html?_r=0.
220. See generally Jennifer Schaubach,”Right to Work” Laws: Get the Facts, MINNESOTA
AFL-CIO, http://www.mnaflcio.org/news/right-work-laws-get-facts (last visited Nov. 17, 2013) (illustrating
that union organization can be difficult in a right to work state).
221. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 101.301 (West 2013); see also Let’s go German, supra note 41
(noting the difficulty unions have organizing in right-to-work states).
222. See Dep’t of Labor, Wages and Hours Div., Minimum Wage Laws in the States (Jan. 1,
2013), http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/america.htm.
223. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.002 (West 2013); see also Becca Aaronson, As Large Companies Opt Out, Concerns Grow for Workers’ Compensation System, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/08/us/fears-grow-for-workers-compensation-system-as-large-texascompanies-opt-out.html?_r=0.
224. See Workers Defense Project, Building, Austin, Building Injustice: Working Conditions in
Austin’s Construction Industry, WORKERSDEFENSE.ORG 2 (2009), http://www.workersdefense.org/wpcontent/uploads/2010/12/Building-_Austn_Report.pdf [hereinafter Building Injustice].
225. Building Injustice, supra note 224.
226. Id. at ii. For a summary of the report’s findings, see Build A Better Texas, The Problem,
BUILDTEXAS.ORG (2010), http://www.buildtexas.org/theproblem.html.).
227. See Building Injustice, supra note 224, at ii.
228. Id. at 26.
229. Id.
230. See id. at 18.
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One example of this type of abuse appeared in the pages of The New York
Times. According to the newspaper, Jose Nieto, an Austin demolition worker, was
injured when a large mirror fell from a wall and sliced into his arm.231 He incurred
roughly $80,000 in medical expenses as a result.232 His employer did not carry
workers’ compensation insurance and did not cover his medical bills.233 Thus,
without a union to advocate on his behalf, and with no external legal protection to
look to, Mr. Nieto bore all the cost of his injury. 234
This type of abuse is not limited to small or regional employers. Consider
Amazon, a large multi-national firm notorious for its opposition to organized labor.235 Although prominently lauded as a job creator, the company has also been
criticized for its questionable labor practices.236 For instance, in response to worker
complaints about excessive heat in 2011, federal regulators launched an investigation into one of the company’s Pennsylvania order-fulfillment facilities.237 Workers
at this facility had been suffering from heat exhaustion, and several had been
rushed to a local emergency room. 238 Many of these victims were not technically
Amazon employees; rather, the company obtained their services through a temporary staffing agency.239 Because Amazon is in a position to bid staffing firms
against each other, the agency in question was under intense pressure to keep its
labor costs low.240 One way in which it did so was to vigorously protest any unemployment-compensation claims.241 The agency also had a strict attendance policy.242 As a result, some employees, after missing work because of heat exhaustion,
lost their jobs.243 The agency then contested those employees’ unemployment
claims.244 Lacking the bargaining power to secure better working conditions, and

231. Steven Greenhouse, The Workers Defense Project, a Union in Spirit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10,
2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/11/business/the-workers-defense-project-a-union-inspirit.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_20130811&_r=0.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Nick Wingfield & Melissa Eddy, In Germany, Union Culture Clashes With Amazon’s Labor
Practices, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/05/business/workers-of-amazondivergent.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (describing the company’s “opposition to unions in its warehouses as
a general principle. . . .”).
236. Mark Landler & Jackie Calmes, Obama Proposes Deal Over Taxes and Jobs, N.Y. TIMES,
July 30, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/31/us/politics/obama-offers-to-cut-corporate-tax-rate-aspart-of-jobs-deal.html?_r=0 (detailing President Obama’s visit to an Amazon facility in order “to illustrate
[his] theme of a job revival in America” and critical reaction thereto).
237. Spencer Soper, Inside Amazon’s Warehouse, THE MORNING CALL, Sept. 18, 2011,
http://www.mcall.com/news/local/mc-allentown-amazon-complaints-20110917,0,7937001,full.story [hereinafter Inside Amazon’s Warehouse].
238. Id.; see also Wingfield & Eddy, supra note 235.
239. Inside Amazon’s Warehouse, supra note 237.
240. Id.
241. Spencer Soper, Amazon warehouse workers fight for unemployment benefits, THE MORNING
CALL, Dec. 17, 2012, http://www.mcall.com/business/mc-amazon-temporary-workers-unemployment20121215,0,2836585.story [hereinafter Amazon workers fight for benefits].
242. Id.
243. See id.
244. Id.
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having no other guarantee of job security,245 these workers were left without even
the minimal safety net employment law ostensibly provided for them.246
Amazon is far from the only large American company to press its advantage
in this manner. Like Amazon, Walmart has begun to rely on outside employment
agencies to obtain part-time workers, who typically earn several dollars less per
hour than their full-time counterparts.247 Similarly, Caterpillar has driven down
average wages by instituting a two-scale system (new employees earn significantly
less than their seniors).248 It has also forced long-term employees to accept wage
freezes.249 It has not been forced to do so by hard economic times; rather, it took
these steps while enjoying record profits. 250 Practices such as these illustrate the
raw power that employers exercise in the absence of strong unions; they enjoy free
rein to adopt harsh, one-sided policies.
Employment law, as it exists today, offers little comfort to the victims of such
policies. Employers have no obligation to pay a living wage, and workers have no
ability to demand otherwise. Nor do workers have any guarantee against wholly
arbitrary discharges. Because the employer is almost always more sophisticated and
has access to better resources, employees are usually outmatched when they seek
even the minimum benefits provided by state law, such as unemployment insurance.251
Clearly, if employment law is ever to provide an effective counterweight in
the way unions once did, legislative action is necessary. But any new laws should
not simply replicate the old collective-bargaining model. As we have seen, the employment-law approach offers certain benefits over collective bargaining, and lawmakers should not sacrifice those benefits in an attempt to reproduce a model that
peaked in the mid-twentieth century. That old model was not perfect,252 and died a
natural death because of that imperfection. Instead, legislators should tailor new
laws to the particular problems American workers face today; they should legislate
for 2013’s workplace, not 1950’s. And in adopting these new laws, they must also
avoid the old model’s major pitfalls; they must not impose crippling costs on em-

245. See Dau-Schmidt, Meeting the Demands, supra note 77, at 689–91 (arguing that
“[i]ndividual workers do not always have the resources, information, or capacity to evaluate adequately all
the risks they encounter in the workplace . . . do not always have the resources or the incentives to negotiate
and enforce efficient contract terms with their employer . . . [and] do not have enough bargaining power to
share fully in potential proceeds of the firm or to prevent possible exploitation by their employer.”).
246. Inside Amazon’s Warehouse, supra note 237; see also Wingfield & Eddy, supra note 235
(Employees have also sued Amazon for allegedly failing to pay them for time spent standing in security
lines.).
247. Greenhouse, Fighting Back, supra note 142.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. See Amazon workers fight for benefits, supra note 241 (“Advocates for the working poor say
the company’s aggressive stance on unemployment compensation exploits low-wage earners who need the
benefit for food, housing and other necessities while they search for other jobs. The workers are often outmatched in the unemployment process.”).
252. See Dau-Schmidt, Meeting the Demands, supra note 77, at 693–94 (listing criticisms of the
collective-bargaining model).
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ployers or cause excessive rigidity in the labor market. 253 Legislators should also
keep in mind the interests of both employees and employers, aiming to enhance
protections for employees while preserving labor market flexibility and minimizing
negative impacts on employers.
Three measures, I believe, fit these criteria:
First, lawmakers should raise the federal minimum wage and index future increases to the Consumer Price Index. Doing so would address broad declines in real
wages and workers’ inability to reverse those declines through bargaining. And
while doing so would raise labor costs, increases would apply uniformly, so they
would not cause competitive imbalances.
Second, lawmakers should ban discrimination against working parents and
other primary caregivers and require employers to make reasonable accommodations in caregivers’ favor. Such a measure would address the widespread discrimination these employees face in the modern workplace, which has been slow to adjust to their needs.254 It would also guarantee these workers the flexibility they
need, but have been generally unable to bargain for on their own. 255 Compliance
costs are likely to be slight, and may even be wholly offset by gains in productivity.
Third, and perhaps most important, lawmakers should enact a national goodcause discharge law. This law would replicate the protection many unionized workers enjoyed under CBAs. To control the impact such a law would have on employers, lawmakers should also create an administrative enforcement scheme and limit
plaintiffs’ remedies. Doing so would lower litigation costs, speed claim resolution,
and reduce uncertainty.
A. Raise the Minimum Wage and Index it to the CPI
The first of these measures—increasing the federal minimum wage—is the
least novel. National policymakers have occasionally proposed increasing the minimum wage.256 During his 2008 presidential campaign, Barack Obama proposed
raising the wage to $9.50 an hour.257 He again proposed an increase in his 2013
State of the Union speech, though by this time he had pared his proposal back to
$9.00 an hour.258 Likewise, Congress recently considered a proposal to raise the
minimum to $10.00 an hour. 259 Media commentators and employment law scholars
have also called for increasing the minimum wage, 260 with some citing the growing
253. See id. at 693–94 (arguing that unions “can put their employers at a competitive disadvantage . . . constrain the supply of labor to drive up wages . . . [and] dislocate workers to other employers
or markets and increase the price of the good to consumers.”).
254. See generally Joan C. Williams & Amy J.C. Cuddy, Will Working Mothers Take Your Company to Court?, HARVARD BUS. REV. (Sept. 2012), http://hbr.org/2012/09/will-working-mothers-take-yourcompany-to-court/ar/1.
255. See id.
256. See Tami Luhby, The impact of a $9 minimum wage, CNNMONEY.COM (Feb. 13, 2013,
9:57 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/02/12/news/economy/obama-minimum-wage.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Rebecca Berg, Bill Pushes for Increase in Wages, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/07/business/bill-pushes-for-increase-in-wages.html.
260. See generally Fast-Food Fight, supra note 218; see also William P. Quigley, ‘A Fair Day’s
Pay for a Fair Day’s Work’: Time to Raise and Index the Minimum Wage, 27 St. Mary’s L.J. 513 (1996).
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pay disparity between average employees and the corporate executives they work
for.261
While these modest increases would not guarantee every American a living
wage, they would nevertheless be worthwhile. At the very least, they would provide low-wage workers with some additional measure of economic security. A fulltime worker earning $9.00 an hour and serving as the primary bread winner in a
household of at least three people would earn only $18,000 per year, 262 leaving him
or her below the federal poverty line. 263 Even at $10.00 an hour, the worker would
earn just $20,800. But both figures would substantially improve upon the $15,080 a
full-time minimum-wage earner brings home today.264
More important than any single increase, however, would be tethering the
minimum wage to future increases in the Consumer Price Index, as some states
have already done.265 Doing so would insulate minimum-wage earners against general inflation and guard against further erosion in their earning power.266 If Congress had taken this step when the minimum wage was at its peak, minimum-wage
earners would now earn $10.52 an hour.267 That increase would have taken place
slowly, without the need for any additional legislative action, and without asking
employers to adjust to dramatic increases in their labor costs.268 Thus, more than
any single increase, an indexing provision would guarantee low-wage earners durable earnings security, while accounting for the difficulties sudden increases could
cause employers. 269
Taking these steps should not have a significant negative impact on employment levels. While the effect of higher minimum wages on job creation is still the
subject of debate,270 the weight of evidence suggests that they do not cause em261. Fast-Food Fight, supra note 218.
262. By “full-time worker,” I mean a person who works for forty hours per week, fifty-two weeks
per year. Keep in mind, this rough figure probably overstates what an ordinary worker would actually earn;
it does not account for unpaid sick days or other time off.
263. What are the annual earnings for a full-time minimum wage worker?, CENTER FOR
POVERTY RESEARCH, http://poverty.ucdavis.edu/faq/what-are-annual-earnings-full-time-minimum-wageworker (last visited Nov. 17, 2013).
264. Id.
265. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.46.020 (West 2013); see also Melanie Hicken, 10
states to boost minimum wage, CNNMONEY.COM (Dec. 31, 2012, 5:31 AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2012/12/31/pf/states-minimum-wage/index.html (citing “indexing” laws in Arizona,
Colorado, Florida, Missouri, Montana, Ohio, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington).
266. See Melanie Hicken, 10 states to boost minimum wage, CNNMONEY.COM (Dec. 31, 2012,
5:31 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/12/31/pf/states-minimum-wage/index.html.
267. Schmitt, The Minimum Wage, supra note 212, at 1.
268. See id.
269. Liana Fox, Indexing the minimum wage for inflation, ECON. POLICY INST. (Dec. 20, 2005),
http://www.epi.org/publication/webfeatures_snapshots_20051221/ (arguing that “[i]nflation indexing guarantees low-wage workers a wage that keeps pace with the rising costs of goods and services.”).
270. Compare John Schmitt, Why Does the Minimum Wage Have No Discernable Effect on Employment?,
CENTER
FOR
ECON.
AND
POL’Y
RESEARCH
(2013),
http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/min-wage-2013-02.pdf [hereinafter Schmitt, Discernable
Effect], and T. William Lester et al., The Facts on Raising the Minimum Wage When Unemployment is
High: Increasing the Minimum Wage During Rough Economic Times Does Not Kill Jobs, CENTER FOR AM.
PROGRESS
ACTION
FUND
(June
20,
2012),
http://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/labor/news/2012/06/20/11749/the-facts-on-raising-the-
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ployers to shed a great number of jobs, if any.271 In an influential 1981 report, the
Minimum Wage Study Commission concluded that indexing the minimum wage to
inflation would have no significant effect on most low-wage earners’ employment
prospects, though it might have a small negative effect on employment rates among
teenagers.272 Subsequent research echoed the Commission’s conclusion about the
minimum wage’s effect on unemployment in general. 273 Some studies went further,
questioning whether minimum-wage hikes even affect teenage employment levels.274 Indeed, rather than finding that high minimum wages kill jobs, some studies
discovered ancillary positive effects, such as the leveling of wage disparities275 and
higher worker productivity.276 They also reported that raising the minimum wage
reduces poverty overall, not just among those families with a minimum-wage
worker, by pushing up incomes across the earnings spectrum. 277 This evidence suggests that raising the minimum wage would not destroy jobs, and might have positive effects above and beyond the direct aid it would provide to low-income workers.278
As we have seen, wage increases are more likely to be effective if adopted at
the national level. For example, federal legislation would have avoided the problems Washington D.C. and Walmart faced in the summer of 2013.279 D.C.’s proposal failed largely because Walmart could have threatened to relocate to Maryland
or Virginia, avoiding the city’s higher minimum wage while still drawing customers from the D.C. area.280 But, an increase in the federal minimum wage would
minimum-wage-when-unemployment-is-high-2/, with DAVID NEUMARK & WILLIAM WASCHER, MINIMUM
WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT (2007), ftp://ftp.iza.org/RePEc/Discussionpaper/dp2570.pdf (abstract) (noting
“a lack of consensus” on whether raising the minimum wage causes unemployment, but finding that “a
sizable majority of the studies” demonstrate that minimum wages have “negative employment effects”),
and Richard A. Ippolito, The Impact of the Minimum Wage if Workers Can Adjust Effort, 46 J.L. & ECON.
207, 207 (2003) (“Most empirical research shows a negative employment effect of the minimum wage,
although mostly these effects are small.”).
271. See Schmitt, Discernable Effect, supra note 270, at 2.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 22 (“[T]wo recent meta-studies analyzing the research conducted since the early 1990s
concludes that the minimum wage has little or no discernible effect on the employment prospects of lowwage workers.”); see also Lawrence F. Katz & Alan B. Krueger, The Effect of the Minimum Wage on the
Fast Food Industry, 46 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 6, 20–21 (1992).
274. See Schmitt, Discernable Effect, supra note 270, at 3 (citing DAVID CARD & ALAN
KRUEGER, MYTH AND MEASUREMENT: THE NEW ECONOMICS OF THE MINIMUM WAGE (Princeton Univ.
Press 1995)).
275. Id. at 20.
276. Id. at 19.
277. John T. Addison & McKinley L. Blackburn, Minimum Wages and Poverty, 52 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 393, 395, 407 (1999). Some studies reaching this conclusion have, however, been challenged based on their assumptions about the minimum wage’s coverage and the degree to which a rise in
minimum wage displaces low-wage workers. See id. at 395.
278. To alleviate any lingering concerns about teenage employment, legislators could simply exempt teenage jobs. Raise Minimum Wage, But Exempt Summer Jobs for Teens, THE BOSTON GLOBE, June
17, 2013, http://www.bostonglobe.com/editorials/2013/06/17/minimum-wage-hike-should-coupled-withlower-rate-for-seasonal-youth-employment/VEodXFoNzZrSKS0xPfN6cP/story.html (urging state lawmakers to raise the general minimum wage to $10 an hour, but to also establish a separate minimum wage
for teenage workers). Doing so would not undermine the principal purpose of raising the minimum wage—
aiding low-income workers and families—as teenagers are less likely to be their families’ primary breadwinners.
279. See Walmart in Washington, supra note 148.
280. See id.
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have foreclosed this option. As a result, D.C.’s government would not have been
forced to choose between bringing jobs to the city and alleviating its high poverty
levels; wages would have risen, and Walmart would have had no incentive to leave.
Moreover, a uniform federal increase would have been fairer to Walmart. One reason Walmart so ardently objected to D.C.’s proposal was that it exempted
Walmart’s unionized competitors, Safeway and Giant. 281 A federal increase would
have applied uniformly, without arbitrarily disadvantaging certain businesses.
Thus, federal legislation would have been more effective in raising wages for
workers in D.C., who otherwise lacked the bargaining power to demand such an
increase, while at the same time not unfairly disadvantaging Walmart.
B. Protect Parents and Other Caregivers from Discrimination
Less obvious than the problem of low wages, but equally important, is workplace discrimination against parents and other primary caregivers (also known as
“family-responsibility discrimination”). Modern America is no longer a country of
two-parent households, consisting of a stay-at-home mother and a career-oriented
father.282 Rather, an increasing number of households are single parent; 283 and even
when both parents are present, both tend to work.284 Moreover, due to an aging
population, larger numbers of women in the workforce, changes in family sizes,
and higher healthcare costs, more and more employees bear the responsibility of
caring for an elder relative. 285 Despite these shifts, employers have been slow to
adjust their leave and scheduling policies286 due, in part, to the perceived cost of

281. Id.
282. See Employment Characteristics of Families Summary, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (Apr. 26,
2013, 10:00 AM), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/famee.nr0.htm (reporting that over 70% of mothers
with children under the age of eighteen work or are looking for work; 64.8% of mothers with children
under the age of six) [hereinafter BLS].
283. Rachel M. Shattuck & Rose M. Kreider, Social and Economic Characteristics of Currently
Unmarried Women with a Recent Birth: 2011, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (May 2013),
http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/acs-21.pdf (reporting that “[t]he percentage of U.S. births to unmarried women has been increasing steadily since the 1940s and has increased even more markedly in recent
years. According to NCHS, the birth rate for unmarried women in 2007 was 80% higher than it was in 1980
and increased 20% between 2002 and 2007.”).
284. BLS, supra note 282 (noting that in more than half of two-parent households, both parents
work).
285. See Margaret B. Neal & Donna L. Wagner, Working Caregivers: Issues, Challenges, and
Opportunities for the Aging Network (Brief), NAT’L FAMILY CAREGIVERS SUPPORT PROGRAM,
http://www.caregiverslibrary.org/Portals/0/Working%20Caregivers%20%20Issues%20for%20the%20Aging%20Network%20Fin-Neal-Wagner.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2013).
286. Workplace Flexibility 2010, Flexible Work Arrangements: Selected Case Studies,
GEORGETOWN
UNIVERSITY
LAW
CENTER
(2010),
http://workplaceflexibility2010.org/images/uploads/FWA_CaseStudies.pdf (“[M]ost workers do not have
access to flexible work arrangements and barriers to their effective implementation persist in many organizations . . . .”); Peggie R. Smith, Parental-Status Employment Discrimination: A Wrong in Need of a
Right?, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 569, 569 (2002) (“Few individuals are employed in job settings that afford
the necessary flexibility to respond adequately to the ‘predictable unpredictability’ of childrearing.”) [hereinafter Smith, Parental Status].
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accommodating caregivers.287 Moreover, even when employers do offer flexible
options, they increasingly288 discriminate against employees who take advantage of
them.289 This discrimination can take the form of passing over employees with
caregiving responsibilities for promotions, assigning them to less-favorable projects, or refusing to hire them altogether. 290 Such unequal treatment affects both
men and women,291 but men often encounter severe hostility.292 And unlike the
victims of other types of discrimination, family-responsibility discrimination victims lack any effective legal recourse.293
The problems presented by this discrimination are closely related to declining
wages, as the effects on low-income workers are particularly harsh.294 Child care
costs can be crushing for those earning low wages. Approximately 40% of lowincome mothers pay for child care, and a third of those that do so spend half of
their income on that alone.295 Another 34% rely on family members to watch their
children.296 But a substantial number of low-income workers do not even have
these less-than-ideal options. According to one survey, 30% of low-income workers polled during a one-week period had to disrupt their work schedules for caregiving responsibilities.297 Nevertheless, most low-wage workplaces offer little to no
flexibility for primary caregivers. 298 Low-wage employers often refuse to make
even minimal accommodations and impose rigid attendance policies that exacerbate caregivers’ dilemmas.299
Two legislative steps would go a long way toward eliminating this inequity
from the workplace. First, lawmakers should require employers to make “reasonable accommodations” for primary caregivers. Lawmakers could model this requirement on similar provisions in the ADA and Title VII, which require employers

287. See Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers Who are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 87 (2003) (“Substantial
literature exists that questions the assumption that accommodating family responsibilities costs employers
money in the context of restructured work.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
288. Stephanie J. Eifler, Choosing Not to Choose: A Legislative Solution for Working Adults Who
Wish to be Successful Employees and Successful Caregivers, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 1205, 1207 (2012) (citing
Stephanie Bornstein & Robert J. Rathmell, Caregivers as a Protected Class?: The Growth of State and
Local Laws Prohibiting Family Responsibilities Discrimination, CTR. FOR WORKLIFE LAW 1 (Dec. 2009),
http://www.worklifelaw.org/pubs/LocalFRDLawsReport.pdf).
289. Id. at 1207 (“As one might guess, pregnant women and mothers of young children are common targets of FRD [family responsibility discrimination], although it can also affect men who wish to take
on more than a nominal role in family caregiving.”) (internal quotation marks and original alterations omitted).
290. See id. at 1211, 1229 (giving examples).
291. Id. at 1208.
292. Bornstein, supra note 201, at 2 (reporting that “lawsuits brought by low-income men show
severe gender stereotyping of men who are responsible for caring for children or elderly parents at home.”).
293. Eifler, supra note 288, at 1212–16 (noting that plaintiffs seeking redress for such discrimination have used a hodge-podge of legal theories, including the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, the FMLA,
and the common-law public-policy exception, with mixed results).
294. Bornstein, supra note 201, at 2.
295. Id. at 5.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 7.
298. Id. at 2.
299. Id.
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to accommodate their employees’ disabilities and religious beliefs, respectively. 300
Similar to those laws, the new law should provide that employers must accommodate their employees’ caregiving obligations, so long as the requested accommodations do not impose an undue hardship.301 For instance, depending on the circumstances, employers might be required to allow parents to take adequate maternity or
paternity leave, offer flexible work schedules, or provide on-site daycare.302 Courts
should not find it difficult to evaluate requested accommodations in context, given
their extensive experience implementing Title VII’s and the ADA’s requirements.303 They can easily reject any unreasonable request for flexibility. For instance, they can distinguish between employees that, by the nature of their work,
must be on duty during specific hours (e.g., receptionists, security guards) and
those whose work is amenable to flexible scheduling (e.g., data-entry workers).
The accommodations that courts do require, moreover, should not significantly burden the affected employers. Compliance costs are likely to be minimal, and
related cost savings may provide a complete offset. These cost savings will come
from two sources: (1) reduced recruitment and training expenses; and (2) increased
productivity.304 First, by accommodating parental obligations, employers can retain
a greater percentage of their young employees—those most likely to be starting
families and raising small children—and thereby reduce their recruiting and retraining expenses.305 In professional firms, these cost savings can be substantial.306 For
example, some estimates put the cost of replacing an experienced law-firm associate somewhere between $200,000 and $500,000.307 And even in nonprofessional
workplaces, finding and training qualified candidates can be quite expensive.308
Second, by retaining their employees for longer periods, employers will enjoy a
more experienced and productive workforce.309 Experienced employees work more
efficiently than new recruits. For instance, an experienced housekeeper can clean
300. See Williams & Segal, supra note 287, at 83 (citing Peggie R. Smith, Regulating Paid
Household Work: Class, Gender, Race, and Agendas of Reform, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 851 (1999) and Martin
H. Malin, Unemployment Compensation in a Time of Increasing Work-Family Conflicts, 29 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 131 (1996)); see also Eifler, supra note 288, at 1222 (suggesting a similar measure).
301. Williams & Segal, supra note 287, at 83.
302. Employer Best Practices for Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiver-best-practices.html (last modified
January 19, 2011) (suggesting employers provide flexible work arrangements, such as flextime programs,
telecommuting, reduced-time options, and job sharing) [hereinafter EEOC Best Practices].
303. See ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 61, at 375–80, 466–71 (citing cases).
304. JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER 88–94 (2000).
305. Why Employees Need Workplace Flexibility, SLOAN CENTER ON AGING & WORK AT
BOSTON C., http://workplaceflexibility.bc.edu/need/need_employees (last visited Nov. 17, 2013) (quoting a
2009 survey reporting that “90% of organizations say their work/life balance programs have improved
worker satisfaction, and nearly three-fourths (74%) say they have improved retention of workers.”).
306. WILLIAMS, supra note 304, at 88.
307. Williams & Segal, supra note 287, at 88.
308. Id. at 89.
309. See Eifler, supra note 288, at 1212 (“‘When workplaces are not responsive to the needs and
wishes for alternative work arrangements of their employees the chances are that these employees will work
below their potential or leave altogether.’”) (quoting Ariane Hegewisch & Janet C. Gornick, Statutory
Routes to Workplace Flexibility in Cross-National Perspective, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POLICY RESEARCH 4
(2008), http://www.lisdatacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/flex-work-report.pdf)).
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eight hotel rooms in the time it takes a new housekeeper to clean six, thereby reducing the employer’s cost per room.310 Even putting aside experience levels, employees in flexible workplaces report being happier, healthier, and more productive.311 Thus, accommodation benefits all parties: employees can balance their
caregiving and work responsibilities, while employers enjoy less turnover and more
productive workers.
A reasonable-accommodation requirement would not, however, be effective
standing alone. Even now, many employers have flexible policies in place, but employees do not use them because they fear retaliation, stigma, or both.312 Moreover,
even when caregivers choose to forgo flexibility options, they are still often viewed
as less competent or dedicated solely because of their familial responsibilities.313
Thus, to guarantee these employees equal treatment in the workforce, and to ensure
the accommodation requirement has its intended effect, Congress should expressly
forbid family-responsibility discrimination.314
This proposal is hardly revolutionary. Scholars have been debating the idea
for years,315 and it has occasionally attracted the attention of lawmakers. For instance, in 1999, Sen. Christopher Dodd introduced the Ending Discrimination
Against Parents Act,316 which would have “[p]rohibit[ed] employment discrimination against parents and those with parental responsibilities.” 317 The Act also provided a mixed-motives framework, conferred enforcement powers on the EEOC,
and outlawed retaliation and coercion.318
Although the Act never became law, it could still serve as a blueprint for future legislation. Today, Congress could adopt it largely in its original form, with
minor amendments to include other primary caregivers and add a reasonableaccommodation requirement. The benefits of doing so would be two-fold. First, the
Act would provide the victims of family-responsibility discrimination with a concrete form of redress. Second, by recognizing family-responsibility discrimination
as invidious, Congress would help eliminate the prevailing stigma against working
caregivers.319
310. Williams & Segal, supra note 287, at 89.
311. See EEOC Best Practices, supra note 302 (“Studies have demonstrated that flexible work
policies have a positive impact on employee engagement and organizational productivity and profitability.”).
312. Eifler, supra note 288, at 1222 (arguing that “even the most caregiver-friendly accommodations will be underutilized if they are not supplemented by antidiscrimination laws that protect caregiver
employees--many of whom need their jobs for their family’s livelihood--from retaliation and discrimination.”).
313. See Williams & Segal, supra note 287, at 90 (“Once a woman’s status as a mother becomes
salient—either because she gets pregnant, takes maternity leave, or adopts a flexible work arrangement—
she may begin to be perceived as a low-competence caregiver rather than as a high-competence business
woman. Thus, women who did not have problems at work before having children may find their competence questioned after they become mothers.”) (footnote omitted).
314. Eifler, supra note 288, at 1218; see Williams & Segal, supra note 287, at 84.
315. See Smith, Parental Status, supra note 286, at 570 (discussing proposals to ending parental
discrimination).
316. S. 1907, 106th Cong. (1999), available at https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/106/s1907.
317. Id.
318. Id. §§ 5, 6, 8, 11.
319. See Eifler, supra note 288, at 1220 (arguing that, “like in other civil rights legislation, antidiscrimination statutes designed to protect caregiver employees are necessary to change attitudes in the
workplace.”).
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C. Protect Employees from Arbitrary Discharge
The two measures just discussed would help fill the void left by organized labor’s decline. Both would address abuses occurring in the modern workplace, and
would provide employees with benefits they have been unable to bargain for individually. But while unions were once essential to raising wages and protecting employees from discrimination, they were also indispensable in protecting employees
from arbitrary discharge. 320 If employment law is ever to fully replace unions in the
modern workplace, lawmakers must create some similar security mechanism. The
best way to do so would be to enact a national good-cause discharge law.321
In the past, union-negotiated CBAs often contained some type of good-cause
discharge clause.322 Employment law, however, currently provides no comparable
protection.323 In most states, the default rule is employment-at-will, under which
employers are generally free to terminate their employees for any reason whatsoever.324 The effect of such a discharge can be devastating.325 Not only do the discharged employees lose their immediate source of income, they often lose an important source of self-esteem326 and ancillary benefits (such as healthcare and child
care).327 Moreover, discharged employees may struggle to obtain new employment,
as many employers look askance at applicants with discharges on their employment
records.328 Because termination can have such severe effects, commentators have
long advocated for good-cause discharge legislation,329 and at least one state has
adopted such a law.330 Nevertheless, today most workers are not covered by a CBA
or wrongful-discharge statute, and thus have no general legal protection against

320. Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Making of the Model Employment Termination Act, 69 WASH.
L. REV. 361, 362 (1994) (noting that one of unions’ “major selling points” was their ability to assure employee job security).
321. Id. at 365.
322. Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 540 N.W.2d 277, 282 (Iowa 1995) (observing that
“federal labor law gave rise to union contracts that include just cause discharge provisions”).
323. Id. at 281–82
324. Id. (tracking the history of the employment-at-will rule).
325. Minda & Raab, supra note 94, at 1161 (“One of the most catastrophic events that can happen in life is the sudden and unexpected loss of gainful employment.”).
326. RICHARD H. PRICE, ET AL., JOB LOSS: HARD TIMES AND ERODED IDENTITY, PERSPECTIVES
ON LOSS: A SOURCEBOOK 303, 304 (John H. Harvey ed. 1998) (noting that job loss can lead to “increased
depressive symptoms, increased anxiety, decreased subjective perceptions of competence, and decreased
self-esteem.”) (internal citations omitted).
327. See id. at 307 (observing that some mental-health effects attributable to job loss may be
caused by resulting economic hardship, including the “loss of access to health care”).
328. Minda & Raab, supra note 94, at 1167 (“The stigma of discharge, even if undeserved, may
be difficult to overcome. . . . The consequences of job loss may be a catastrophic event for many discharged
employees, effectively removing them from the labor market.”).
329. See, e.g., Parween S. Mascari, Comment, What Constitutes A “Substantial Public Policy” in
West Virginia for Purposes of Retaliatory Discharge: Making A Mountain Out of A Molehill?, 105 W. VA.
L. REV. 827, 871 (2003); Mark A. Redmiles, Shelter from the Storm: The Need for Wrongful Discharge
Legislation in Alaska, 6 ALASKA L. REV. 321 (1989); St. Antoine, supra note 320, at 362.
330. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901–915 (West 2013).
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most forms of arbitrary dismissal.331 A national good-cause discharge law would
shield these millions of vulnerable workers.
Such a law need not impose substantial costs on employers. Indeed, lawmakers could craft the law to be more efficient than the costly, patchwork system in
place today. In many states, court-made common law currently provides employees
a wrongful-discharge cause of action, at least when their termination violated a
clearly articulated public policy.332 When a discharged employee files suit in one of
these states, courts must determine what counts as a sufficiently definite public
policy.333 This inquiry is often a difficult one, 334 and litigation expenses are a burden for all parties involved. The average employee is typically unable to finance
extended litigation, and many cannot convince an attorney to risk taking their case
on contingency.335 Although employers are generally deeper-pocketed than employees, they too can drown in litigation costs. One study estimated that almost
75% of wrongful-discharge suits that go to trial result in a verdict for the employee,
the average award being $450,000.336 And even victories do not come cheap for
employers: the average successful defense costs between $100,000 and
$200,000.337
Federal legislation, if carefully drafted, could replace this narrow, imprecise,
and costly system with an efficient, speedy, and well-defined administrative
scheme. In doing so, legislators should look to state unemployment-compensation
schemes, in which administrative decision makers must regularly determine whether an employee was terminated for job-related misconduct.338 As in many of those
schemes, Congress could ease the decision makers’ task by listing per se examples

331. See Berks, supra note 31, at 255, 260 (observing that private-sector union membership declined and that Montana is the only state to have adopted a good-cause discharge statute).
332. See supra note 36.
333. See St. Antoine, supra note 320, at 364 (“The tort theory generally requires some outrageous
violation of a well-established public policy, a relatively rare occurrence.”) (footnote omitted).
334. See, e.g., Ballinger v. Del. River Port Auth., 800 A.2d 97, 107–10 (N.J. 2002) (struggling
with whether policeman’s termination by agency created by a Pennsylvania-New Jersey compact, allegedly
for investigating and reporting criminal activity, violated a clear public policy); Bradley T. Ewing et al., The
Employment Effects of a “Good Cause” Discharge Standard in Montana, 59 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 17
(2005) (citing criticism of the uncertainty created by Montana’s judicially created exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine, including a public-policy exception).
335. St. Antoine, supra note 320, at 365.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 52-06-02(2) (West 2011); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 802(e)
(2002); D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 7, § 3-12 (1994); Jadallah v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 476 A.2d 671, 675
(D.C. 1984) (applying the statutory misconduct standard); Hansen v. C.W. Mears, Inc., 486 N.W.2d 776,
780 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (applying a scheme differentiating between “misconduct” and “gross misconduct”); Hulse v. Job Serv. N. Dakota, 492 N.W.2d 604, 608 (N.D. 1992) (providing examples of misconduct); Frumento v. Unemp’t Comp. Bd. of Rev., 351 A.2d 631, 633 (Pa. 1976) (interpreting statutory requirement of discharge for “willful misconduct”); see also James K. Bradley & Carol J. Mowery, Trends in
Unemployment Compensation Law, 80 PA. B.A. Q. 117, 119 (2009) (observing that although “the term
‘willful misconduct’ is not defined in the [l]aw, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has defined it as an act of
wanton or willful disregard of the employer’s interests, a deliberate violation of the employer’s rules, a
disregard of the standard of behavior which the employer has a right to expect of an employee, or negligence indicating an intentional disregard of the employer’s interests or of the employee’s duties and obligations to the employer.”).
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of good-cause in the statute itself. 339 Such examples might include the willful disregard for an employer’s written policies, a drug-test failure, or conviction of a
crime. Congress could also explicitly incorporate arbitration principles, which
would supply a ready-made body of arbitral precedent for administrative decision
makers to reach for.340 Furthermore, Congress could also explicitly preempt state
wrongful-discharge law and make the administrative scheme exclusive, with only
limited judicial review. Doing so would provide uniformity across state lines. 341
Finally, Congress could strictly limit plaintiffs’ remedies by, for example, permitting recovery only of a certain period of back wages. This would insure employers
against potentially devastating verdicts, which in some cases have gone as high as
$20 million.342 Taken together, these steps would reduce any uncertainty in the nature of “good cause,” speed claim resolution, and lower costs.
Montana, the only state to have yet adopted a good-cause discharge statute,343
provides the best illustration of how such a scheme might play out on the national
level. In the early 1980s, the Montana Supreme Court handed down a number of
employee-friendly decisions carving out new exceptions to the employment-at-will
doctrine.344 Some evidence suggests that these new exceptions depressed employment rates in the state, perhaps by scaring away employers.345 In response, the state
legislature adopted the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act (WDEA),
which made it unlawful for an employer to terminate a nonprobationary employee
other than for good cause. 346 While the Act displaced the common-law employment-at-will doctrine—a potentially frightful prospect for employers—it also
placed checks on run-away litigation.347 For instance, the Act’s attorneys’ fees
339. See D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 7, § 3-12 (1994) (providing examples of “gross misconduct,” such
as sabotage, theft, dishonesty, intoxication, and repeated absences); MO. ANN. STAT. § 288.050 (West
2013) (providing that absenteeism or tardiness give rise to a rebuttable presumption of misconduct); see,
e,g., TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 201.012 (West 2013) (defining “misconduct” to include “mismanagement of
a position of employment by action or inaction, neglect that jeopardizes the life or property of another,
intentional wrongdoing or malfeasance, intentional violation of a law, or violation of a policy or rule adopted to ensure the orderly work and the safety of employees,” but not “an act in response to an unconscionable act of an employer or superior”).
340. See St. Antoine, supra note 320, at 371 (noting that the drafters of the Model Employment
Termination Act, “META,” took a similar approach).
341. See id. at 367 (explaining that META’s drafters were motivated in part “on studies indicating that recent judicial modifications in the doctrine of employment at will had created great uncertainty for
both employers and employees.”).
342. See id. at 365 (“Juries can succumb to emotional appeals, and they have awarded single individuals $20 million, $4.7 million, $3.25 million, $2.57 million, $2 million, $1.5 million, $1.19 million,
and $1 million.”) (footnote omitted).
343. Ewing et al., supra note 334, at 17 (stating “Montana became the only state to adopt a ‘good
cause’ standard for discharge of employees…”).
344. Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 1063, 1067 (Mont. 1982) (establishing a good-faith
exception); Keneally v. Orgain, 606 P.2d 127, 129 (Mont. 1980) (establishing a public-policy exception).
345. Ewing et al., supra note 334, at 22 (hypothesizing that “[e]mployment growth in Montana
was negatively affected by the adoption of the public policy exception in Keneally in January 1980 and the
good faith exception in Gates in January 1982”).
346. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901–915 (West 2013).
347. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-913 (West 2013) (preempting common-law remedies); see
also Ewing et al., supra note 334, at 21 (“The ‘good cause’ provision substantively altered the traditional
rule of employment-at-will and effectively replaced the common law good faith exception.”).
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scheme strongly encouraged plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims rather than file
suit.348 The Act also limited potential recoveries to a maximum of four years’ lost
wages and fringe benefits; plaintiffs could not recover for pain, suffering, or emotional distress.349 Further, the Act required plaintiffs to exhaust their employers’
internal grievance procedures.350 Perhaps as a result of these limits, the Act proved
beneficial to both employees and employers. Employment rates in the state stabilized,351 and the stock prices of Montana’s publically traded companies rose measurably.352
In light of Montana’s experience, lawmakers should feel comfortable that a
good-cause discharge law would not only stabilize wrongful-discharge law across
the country, but also reduce litigation costs. More importantly, it would directly
address nonunionized employees’ vulnerability to arbitrary discharge. The law
would permanently displace the harsh employment-at-will doctrine and extend to
nonunion employees the protection their union counterparts once enjoyed. This,
more than any other step lawmakers could take, would move employment law toward filling the role organized labor once played.
CONCLUSION
In proposing these measures, I do not imply that they are the only worthwhile
employment-law measures. I do not even suggest that they are necessarily the best
possible solutions; surely, there are other, equally worthy measures. I also do not
suggest that the broad outlines in which I have sketched my proposals could not be
improved by further refinement. Rather, I offer these proposals only as a starting
point, a place to begin a discussion about expanding and enhancing modern employment law to fill in the gaps left by organized labor’s decline.
And make no mistake—that discussion is crucial. Organized labor’s collapse
has left workers with no effective counterweight to their employers’ near-unilateral
power over the employment relationship. Whatever small measure of power workers still have, it comes to them by way of external legal rights; i.e., employment
law. But employment law does not yet totally fill unions’ vacant shoes. Recognizing that an imbalance still exists between employers and nonunion employees, and
that vigorous employment laws are the only way to correct that imbalance, is the
first step. The second step is expanding and strengthening employment law in a
way that addresses the problems of today’s workplace. Whether lawmakers do so
by taking up the measures proposed here, or others, they must do something to fill
organized labor’s place. They cannot simply hope for a miraculous labor revival;
unions are gone and are not coming back. Lawmakers must go to work with the
tool they have—employment law.
348. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-915 (West 2013) (“A party who makes a valid offer to arbitrate that is not accepted by the other party and who prevails in an action under this part is entitled as an
element of costs to reasonable attorney fees incurred subsequent to the date of the offer.”).
349. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-905 (West 2013).
350. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-911 (West 2013).
351. Ewing et al., supra note 334, at 17 (arguing that “the seminal Montana wrongful discharge
case reduced annual employment growth in Montana by 0.46 percentage points, and that the ‘good cause’
statute restored the original growth rate”).
352. Ewing et al., supra note 334, at 21–22.

